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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Bob and Rhonda Backman ("Backmans") own a piece of property in Bonner County that

is not accessible by any public road or easement of record; it is legally landlocked. This property
is more particularly described as the S 112 of the NW 114 and the S 112 of the NW 114 of the
NW 114 of Section 8, Township 57 Nortb, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian (the "Backman
Property").

While legally landlocked, the record in this matter reflects that the Backman

Property has been accessible via roadways across the adjacent Section 7 since at least the 1950s.
Presently, the properties through which these roadways pass in Section 7 are owned by
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents, who collectively belong to the Pend Oreille View
Owners' Association, Inc. ("POVE") (Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents and POVE are
collectively referred to as "Defendants").

In April 2005, POVE recorded a Declaration of

Non-Access that stated the roads through Section 7 were "private" and deemed that there is
"absolutely no right" to use the roads to access property located in Section 8.
With this litigation, Backmans seek access to their legally landlocked property.
Backmans claim a right to access their property pursuant to condemnation of a private roadway,
an easement by necessity, a prescriptive easement, or some combination of these theories.

B.

Proceedings Before The District Court.
On February 24, 2006, Backmans filed a Complaint against Defendants Spagon, Rogers,

Lloyd, Johnson, Lawrence, Schrader, Millward and POVE, asserting a right to cross over
Defendants' property to gain access to the Backman Property. R. Vol. I, p. 19. Backmans
asserted three theories pursuant to which they were entitled to cross over Defendants' properties
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to access the Backman Property: Prescriptive easement, court declaration of a public road and
private condemnation. Id. As discovery progressed, Backmans dismissed their claim seeking
p.3.
declaration of a public road. R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007~'~
On August 21, 2006, Backmans filed a First Amended Complaint adding additional
Defendants over whose property Backmans needed to cross to access the Backman Property.
R. Vol. I, p. 44. The additional Defendants included Gregory and Theresa Zinves, Christopher
Bessler, Robert and Lynn Walsh, and Patrick and Michelle McKenna. Id. The First Amended
Complaint alleged new causes of action for access to the Backman Property based upon the
theory of easement by necessity, as the recorded documents reflected previous common
ownership between Section 7 and Section 8, and that the partition of Sections 7 and S left the
Backman Property landlocked. Id. Prior to trial, Victoria Rogers granted an easement to
Backmans to access the Backman Property over and across her property, and was dismissed from
the litigation. R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007, p. 3. Dr. and Mrs. Lawrence
also conveyed an easement over and across their property to the Backman Property. ldZ'
At the time of trial, Defendant Schrader sought to file a cross-claim against the other
Defendants. R. Vol. I, p. 173. Schrader is the owner of twenty (20) acres that is adjacent to the
Backman Property and that Randy Powers ('"Powers") and all other previous owners had
commonly owned with the Backman Property. Id. The District Court permitted Schrader's

11

All references to "Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007," refer to the brief filed by Plaintiffs
following the District Court trial of this matter, and which Brief is also an exhibit to the Clerk's
Record on Appeal.

31

Based upon a stipulation between the parties, as is referenced in the District Court's
Memorandum Opinion (R. Vol. 11, p. 263), a parcel of property owned by the City of Sandpoint
("City") and located between Baldy Mountain Road and Defendants' properties was excluded
from the lawsuit because the City has granted access over its property to all parties subject to
certain restrictions common to all parties.
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cross-claim against the Defendants to obtain access under the same legal theories, along the same
routes, and for the same purposes as Backmans. R. Vol. 11, p. 259-60.
Trial was held from September 4 to September 7, 2007. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. In the posttrial briefs, Backmans stated that they "seek a judgment from this Court granting access to their
Property for use by one (1) residence on each of the twenty (20) acre parcels owned by
Backmans, for a total of five ( 5 ) residences." R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007,
p. 4. Backmans limited their access claims to the roads named Turtle Rock RoadJSyringa Creek

Road, and three of their extensions referred to as the Upper Road, the Middle Road and the
Lower Road. R. Vol. 11, p. 264.31 Backmans claimed access based upon the following theories:
1.

A prescriptive easement east over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road from the

City property, north over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Upper,
Middle or Lower Road into Section 8;
2.

A privately condemned easement east over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek

Road, north over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Upper, Middle
or Lower Road into Section 8, with just compensation to the landowners;

3.

An easement by necessity east over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, north

over Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Middle or Lower Road into
Section 8; or
4.

An easement by necessity north of the Lawrence property on Turtle Rock

RoadSyringa Creek Road, and east over either the Middle or Lower Roads, coupled with either
a prescriptive easement or privately condemned easement over Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek
Road between the City property and the Lawrence property.
21

A map of the roads at issue is attached to Appellants' Brief as Exhibit A and is the map
referenced as part of the District Court's Memorandum Opinion. R. Vol. 11, p. 299.
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R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26,2007, p. 4.
The District Court filed its Memorandum Opinion on November 14, 2007. R. Vol. 11,
p. 258. The District Court denied Backmans' claims for prescriptive easement, easement by
necessity, and to condemn a private roadway over Defendants' properties, and declined to
combine the theories to provide access to the Backman Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 297-98.
The District Court entered its Judgment on January 2, 2008, denying Backmans' claims
for a prescriptive easement, easement by necessity and to condemn a private roadway, and
dismissed Backmans' and Schrader's claims with prejudice.

R. Vol. 11, p. 300-02.

District Court awarded Defendants their costs on March 10, 2008.

The

R. Vol. 11, p. 367-68.

Backmans appeal the District Court's decision denying the Backmans legal access to their
landlocked property.
C.

Statement Of Facts.
Backmans own one hundred (100) acres of landlocked property in Bonner County, Idaho.

R. Ex. Post-Trial Brief filed September 26, 2007, p. 1. McKenna, Bessler, Lawrence, Zirwes,
Johnson, Lloyd, Grant, Millward, Spagon and Schrader all own property in Section 7 through
which Backmans seek a right of access. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46.*'
Prior to 1904, all of the properties at issue in this dispute in Sections 7 and 8 were owned
by the United States Government. The property adjoining the Backman Property to the west in
Section 7 was patented by the United States Government in individuals from 1904 through 1907.
(Haroldson in December 1904 [Plaintiffs' Exhibit 301; Gould in May 1905 [Plaintiffs'

4/

All references to "Plaintiffs' Exhibit. . ." refer to those Exhibits offered by Plaintiffs and
admitted into evidence at the District Court trial of this matter, and which Exhibits are also
exhibits to the Clerk's Record on Appeal.
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Exhibit 311; and Fobert in May 1907 [Plaintiffs' Exhibit 201.) Since the time the Backman
Property was patented by the United States Government, it has been landlocked. Id.
On September 11, 1907, the United States Government patented the Backrnan and
Schrader Properties to McKenna.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.

On August 20, 1908, McKenna

conveyed the Backman Property to the Humbird Lumber Company ("Humbird").

Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 3. Until 1943, Humbird owned the Backman and Schrader Properties, as well as portions
of Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22. In 1943, Humbird conveyed its property in Section 7 to
Modig. Id. The Modig parcel consists of the properties currently owned by Lawrence, Johnson,
Lloyd, Grant and Millward.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46.

Upon Humbird's conveyance of the

properties in Section 7 to Modig, the Backman Property remained landlocked. The only access
to a public road at the time of that severance was through Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42.
The chain of title to the Backman Property in Section 8 is more particularly set forth in
Exhibit B attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
The Backman Property is located near Syringa Creek, which drains in a southerly
direction from Section 7 into Section 8, down a mountainside. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. Syringa Creek
crosses a small portion of the southwestern corner of the Backman Property as it descends into
the Pend Oreille River. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49.
The Backman Property is steep. An examination of the 1968 United States Geological
Survey topographical map presented at trial reveals elevation variations of approximately
1,000 feet within the Backman Property. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49. Compared to the property to the
west of Syringa Creek, the Backman Property to the east is steeper and more rugged. R. Vol. 11,
p. 266.
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Historically, the Backman Property, as well as the property located in Section 7 to the
east of the Backman Property were used for logging. R. Vol. 11, p. 260. Logging operations
created roads that crossed Syringa Creek from the west in Section 7 to the higher ground east of
Syringa Creek in Section 8. R. Vol. 11, p. 266. The record reflects that roads through Section 7
provided access to the Backman Property in Section 8 since at least 1933. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42;
Tr. p. 342, L. 10-13.
Turtle Rock Road has been in existence since the 1930s; its exact location over Section 7
has changed only slightly over the years. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42. Originally, Turtle Rock Road
entered Section 7 from Baldy Mountain Road further to the southwest, but was later relocated to
its current location in the 1950s. Id. Turtle Rock Road runs from the public Baldy Mountain
Road east across a portion of property owned by the City, and continues east through the
McKenna, Bessler, Zinves and Lawrence properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Turtle Rock Road
then turns north across the Johnson, Lloyd, Millward, Grant, Spagon and Rogers properties. Id.
The portion of Turtle Rock Road travelling north from the Millward property to the intersection
with Inspiration Way and the Upper Road (discussed below) is what the District Court
referenced as the old Syringa Creek Road. R. Vol. 11, p. 266.
Heading east into Section 8 from three points along Turtle Rock Road are three branch
roads that historically provided access to Section 8. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 42,46. These roads are
designated as the Lower, Middle and Upper Roads. The Lower Road runs northwest from Turtle
Rock Road over the Lloyd, Johnson and Grant properties into the Backman Property in
Section 8. Id. The Middle Road runs east from Turtle Rock Road across the Millward and Grant
properties into the Backman Property in Section 8. Id.
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The Upper Road runs from the

intersection of Inspiration Way and the old Syringa Creek Road east over the Rogers and
Schrader properties into the Backrnan Property in Section 8. Id.
Redtail Hawk Road runs off of Turtle Rock Road to the north at an intersection near the
borders of the Bessler and Zirwes properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Redtail Hawk Road was
constructed some time between 1981 and 1992. Tr. p. 338, L. 17-19. Redtail Hawk Road
appears in the real property records in 1994 with the recording of a Record of Survey. Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 27. Redtail Hawk Road intersects with Inspiration Way on the Gillespie property, and
then heads northeast through the Harris, Marley and Spagon properties. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46.
Inspiration Way connects to the Upper Road at the intersection with the old Syringa Creek Road
on the Rogers property. Redtail Hawk Road and Inspiration Way are private roads under the
ownership and control of POVE. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 36, 39.
Between 1958 and 1975, and 1992 and 1998, Turtle Rock Road and the Upper, Middle
and Lower Roads were used to access the Backman Property for logging. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42.
From 1994 to 2004, Turtle Rock Road and the Upper, Middle and Lower Roads were used to
access the Backman Property for monitoring erosion control and timber growth, hunting,
camping and other recreational pursuits. Tr. p. 225-27,261-67.
Powers purchased the Backman Property in 1994 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1I), and extensively
logged the Backman Property from 1994 to 1996, using Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road
and the three extensions for access. R. Vol. 11, p. 271. Powers continued to maintain and use the
subject roads in Section 7 after 1996. R. Vol. 11, p. 271-73. Powers testified that he used the
subject roads to remove certain wooden bridges used in his logging operations. Tr. p. 221,
L. 18 - p. 222, L. 10. Powers installed a culvert on the Middle Road. Tr. p. 222, L. 17 - p. 223,
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L. 25. Powers performed "driving maintenance" and periodically graded the roads. Tr. p. 224,
L. 1-5. He also built a skid trail off of the Middle Road. Tr. p. 224, L. 14-16.
After 1996, Powers used the Backman Property for recreational purposes, such as hunting
and camping, continuing to use the subject roads in Section 7 for access. R. Vol. 11, p. 273;
Tr. p. 225, L. 21 - p. 227, L. 14. Powers continued to use the subject roads until he sold the
Backman Property to Backmans in 2005. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-62.
By the 1990s, logging activities declined and landowners in Sections 7 and 8 were selling
their property to individuals and developers for the purpose of building residences. R. Vol. 11,
p. 267. The property to the west of Syringa Creek in the east half of Section 7 is divided into
ten (10) and twenty (20) acre parcels with a single residence on most parcels. Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 46. The Backman Property and other land in Section 8 remains undeveloped.
Backmans purchased the Backman Property in 2005 desiring to duplicate the type of
residences existing in Section 7. R. Vol. 11, p. 259. Backmans subdivided the 100-acre Backman
Property into five (5) separate parcels of twenty (20) acres each. Id.; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16.
Backmans purchased the Backman Property believing they had legal access. Backmans
purchased a title policy insuring access. R. Vol. 11, p. 287. Backmans commenced this litigation
after they were prohibited from using the roads in Section 7 to access the Backman Property in
Section 8, and after their discovery that there was no deeded, recorded legal access to the
Backman Property.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a map depicting the roads and properties at issue in this
case. The map is a copy of a portion of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46. Backmans' counsel has identified
the roads on the map to aid this Court in its analysis.
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11.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Easement Bv Necessity.
Should this Court overturn the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim, 117

Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989), and hold that common ownership in the United States Government
satisfies the requirement of unity of title for the purpose of establishing a right to an easement by
necessity?
B.

Private Condemnation.
Did the District Court err by ruling Backmans were not entitled to condemn an easement

over and across an existing road on Defendants' property to access the Backman Property?
C.

Prescriptive Easement.
Did the District Court err by improperly applying obsolete "presumptions" and "burden

shifting analysis" to Backmans' prescriptive easement claims?
D.

Combination Of Easement By Necessity. Private Condemnation And/or
Prescriptive Easement.
Did the District Court err in declining to combine easement by necessity, private

condemnation andlor prescriptive easement theories to provide Backmans access to the
landlocked Backman Property?
E.

District Court's Award Of Costs To Defendants.
Did the District Court e n by awarding Defendants their costs of litigation?

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 9
1:\1547.ll IWPEAL\Appellants'Brief i .doc

111.
ARGUMENT

A.

This Court Should Overrule Roberts v. Swim,117 Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989). And Hold
That Common Ownershia In The United States Government Satisfies The Unity Of
Title Element For An Easement Bv Necessity Claim.
At trial, Backrnans sought an easement by necessity to gain access to the Backman

Property. In denying Backrnans' claim, the District Court made the following rulings:
The parties agree that, without some access afforded through this
lawsuit, the one-hundred twenty (120) acres in question in the
northwest quarter in the northwest quarter of Section 8 are legally
landlocked. The term "legally" means that the one-hundred twenty
(120) acres is not served by any public road and has no written
right of easement access. The one-hundred twenty (120) acres is
surrounded by ground held in other ownerships.

At the time of the U.S. Patents, the north half of the northeast
quarter of Section 7 was within a U.S. Patent of 1905. The
southwest quarter of the southeast quarter in Section 7 was part of
a second separate U.S. patent of 1904. The Modig parcel and the
one-hundred twenty (120) acres in the northwest quarter of
Section 8 (the Humbird property as of 1943) were in two (2)
patents as of 1907, separate from the 1904 and 1905 patents.
Therefore, but for the original common ownership of the United
States, there has never been a unity of title of common ownership
for the original Humbird Lumber property in question (the 1907
patents for the Modig parcel, and for the one-hundred twenty (120)
acres in the northwest quarter of section 8) and for either the
property now owned by Spaeons (in the southwest quarter of the
northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 7; a part of the
1905 patent) or the property now owned by McKenna's and
Besslers (in the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 7; a part of the 1904 patent). Defendant Exhibit KK.
Plaintiffs candidly acknowledge existing Idaho case law indicating
that unity of title cannot be established by relying upon the original
ownership of the United States. Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9
(Ct.App 1989). Backmans set forth a reasonable legal argument as
why another rule of law might he better (at least for their purposes
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in this case). However. this Court will follow existing Idaho case
law.
- Easement by necessity as a "stand alone" legal theory, simply
does not apply, because unity of title is lacking as to the properties
covered by the entire length of the road access necessary to
physically connect the Backman parcel to Baldy Mountain Road.
R. Vol. 11, p. 282-83 (emphasis added).
The District Court ruled that Backmans established unity of title in the United States
along the entire length of Turtle Rock RoaaSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions,
sufficient for an easement by necessity; however, the District Court determined that it was bound
by the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim and for that reason denied Backmans'
claim.
This Court should overrule the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts v. Swim; hold that
common ownership in the United States satisfies the unity of title element for an easement by
necessity; hold that Backmans are entitled to an easement by necessity; and, remand the case
back to the District Court for a determination as to the scope of the easement.
1.

Common owners hi^ in the United States is Sufficient to Satisfy the Unitv of
Title Element of an Easement by Necessitv Claim.
A party claiming an easement by necessity over another's land must prove:

1) unity of title followed by separation of the dominant and servient estates; 2) necessity of the
easement at the time of separation; and 3) great present necessity for the easement. Hughes v.

Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,483 (2006). An implied easement by necessity is grounded in the "sound
public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or successful cultivation."

Cordwell v. Smilh, 105 Idaho 71, 79 (Ct.App. 1983) (quoting Burley Brick & Sand Co. v. Cofer,
102 Idaho 333, 335 (1981)). Idaho has long recognized the principle that where a tract of land is
conveyed that is separated from the highway by other lands of the grantor or surrounded by his
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lands or by his and those of third persons, there arises by implication, in favor of the grantee, a
way of necessity across the grantor's property to the highway. Id.
An easement by necessity does not depend on use of roadways existing at the time

of separation. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79. An easement by necessity may arise where no roads
exist across the grantor's property at the time of separation. Id. "Thus, a remote grantee of land
not being used at the time of severance . . . may nevertheless, when the use becomes necessary to
the enjoyment of his property, claim the easement under this remote deed." Id.
A way of necessity arises from public policy considerations. It
is, literally, a creature of necessity. The necessity must exist at
the time of the severance by the common owner, and the
person claiming such an easement must also show there is a
present necessity for it. Once established, a way of necessity
exists only so long as the necessity lasts, for it is the policy of
the law not to burden a servient estate more or longer than is
necessary.

Id. An easement by necessity arises by implication to protect and promote the dominant estate
owner's use and enjoyment of his or her property. Idaho's public policy is against landlocking
property and in favor of the occupation, cultivation, and full beneficial use and enjoyment of
land. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 482-83; Burley Brick& Sand Co., 102 Idaho at 335; Cordwell,
105 Idaho at 79.
One justification for the easement by necessity is that the
grantor is "presumed to have intended" to retain or to have
conveyed to grantees "a means of access to the property in
question, so that the land may be beneficially utilized." It
arises "by implied grant" when property is severed in a way
that leaves part of it landlocked. Another, and perhaps the
better, iustification is that public policy prohibits land from
being conveyed away in a manner that renders it useless, and
the easement by necessity arises to cure that problem. The
public poiicy iustification for the way of necessity often
contravenes the intent of the original grantor or grantee; it
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"ariscs 'to nleet a special emergency. . . in order that no land
kkfiinggce~siblefor the purposcs of cultivation. . . ."'
[Emphasis added; citations omitted.] Thomuson on Real Proper@, $ 60.03@)(5)(i).
In Roberts, the case relied on by the District Court to deny Backmans' claims, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Roberts' claim for an easement by necessity on the grounds that
Roberts could only prove unity of title in the public. The Roberts court remanded the case to the
district court to craft more particularized findings with respect to Roberts's prescriptive easement
claim. Roberts, 117 Idaho at 15. In dismissing Roberts's easement by necessity claim, the Court
of Appeals stated without any analysis that "Roberts has established only that the land was at one
time originally under public ownership. Original ownership by the public or state is not
sufficient to constitute the necessary unity of ownership." Id. (quoting Annot., Unity of Title for
Easement by Implication or Way of Necessity, 94 A.L.R.3D 502, 517-18 (1979)). The Court of
Appeals did not explain its citation to the ALR, nor did it give any analysis for its decision. The
Court of Appeals' statement in Roberts should be overruled.
First, the Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts was dicta; it was not necessary to
a resolution of the case. The court remanded the case to determine if a prescriptive easement
existed and should never have addressed the easement by necessity issue. If a prescriptive
easement existed, or was found to exist on remand, the "necessity" required for an easement by
necessity would not exist and the issue of easement by necessity moot. Therefore, the Roberts
court never needed, and should not have, ruled on the issue of unity of title until the district court
ruled on the prescriptive easement issue on remand.
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Second, Idaho's public policy calling for the full use of lands and sound legal
analysis favors allowing the unity of title element to be satisfied by a showing of common
ownership in the United States Government.
Several courts, based on sound legal analysis, have held that common ownership
by the United States is sufficient to satisfy the unity of title element. Kellogg v. Garcia,
102 Cal.App.4th 796, 799 (Cal.Ct.App. 2002); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995, 1002
(D.Utah 1979); Kinscherff v. US., 586 F.2d 159, 161 (10" Cir. 1978). 4 Powell on Real
Property agrees with the holding in those cases as sound public policy.
The public policy favoring land utilization applies to cases
where ownership was in the state as well as where the original
unity of ownership was in a private person. Similarly, the
bases for attributing to the parties a fictional intent to create
such an easement are no less present when one of the parties
was the government.
4 Powell on Real Property, § 34.07 at 34-59 (2000).
In Kellogg v. Garcia, the court held that the unity of title element of an easement
by necessity claim could be proved with evidence of common ownership in the government.

Kellogg, 102 Cal.App.4th at 799. The court explained that "current case law holds that the
federal government may be the common owner of the properties whose conveyance gives rise to
the strict necessity that justifies an easement by way of necessity." Id. In that case, the plaintiff
was entitled to an easement by necessity to access its private property where the unity of title
element was proved with evidence of common ownership by the government. Id. at 81 1. The
court reasoned that:
Since an easement by way of necessity is based on the
presumption that a conveyance seeks to transfer whatever is
necessary for the beneficial use of that property, there is
absolutely no reason to impute a different intention to the
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federal government when conveying western lands (failing an
expression of intent to the contrary). After all, particularly in
the 1 9 ' ~century-when the West was being settled- the federal
government has no reason to render the land it conveyed unfit
for occupancy or cultivation. Quite the opposite.

Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted) .
The court in Kellogg also addressed the arguments against unity of title being
proved with government ownership. The court noted that:
The opposing concern is that an easement by necessity over
former federal land would permit every remote grantee of a
portion of the public domain to have an easement by way of
necessity over surrounding lands. This argument overlooks the
special terminability aspect of easements by necessity upon a
change of circumstances.
The changed circumstances
effectively eliminate the necessity.
Id. at 808 n. 5 (internal citations omitted). The court found that the public policies and rationales
behind easements by necessity would not be served by the creation of a "categorical exception"
for ownership by the federal government. Id. at 808.
As the court noted in Kellogg, proving unity of title in the government serves the
purposes of easements by necessity. In addition, the proverbial floodgates will not open if
government ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. An
easement by necessity exists only so long as the necessity exists. Even where government
ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim, a claimant will
not be entitled to an easement by necessity where there is no need for such easement (i.e., where
the claimant has other legal access to the subject property). A claimant still must prove the other
required elements for an easement by necessity: Necessity at the time of separation of the
dominant and servient estates, and great present necessity for the easement.
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In Utah v. Andrus. the United States District Court for the District of Utah held
that an easement for access could arise by implication upon a grant of land by the federal
government. 486 F.Supp. at 1002. There, the court examined whether access could be had to
school trust land that was granted by the federal government to the State of Utah, but landlocked
by other federal property. Id. at 999. The court found that the purpose of school trust lands
granted by the federal government to the states was to provide the states with a revenue source
from which to support public schools. Id. at 1002. The court reasoned that "unless a right of
access is inferred, the very purpose of the school trust lands would fail. Without access the state
could not develop the trust lands in any fashion and they would become economically worthless.
This Congress did not intend." Id. The court noted that traditional property law theories
supported a finding of access to the school trust lands. Id The court stated that "under the
common law it was assumed that a grantor intended to include in the conveyance whatever was
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land in question." Id Therefore, in consideration of
the revenue-producing purpose of school trust lands and the common law policies supporting the
cultivation and use of landlocked property, the court ruled that the State of Utah and its lessees
had access to the school trust lands. Id at 1011.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the transfer of a patent by
the United States may give rise to an implied easement for access. Kinscheif v. US.,
586 F.2d 159, 161 (lothCir. 1978) .
This Court should also hold that the unity of title element for an easement by
necessity may be proved with evidence of common ownership by the government. Such a
holding would promote Idaho's "sound public policy that lands should not he rendered unfit for
occupancy or successful cultivation."
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Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79 (quoting Burley Brick&

Sand Co., 102 Idaho at 335). Such a holding would not open the floodgates to every property
owner seeking an easement by necessity. On the contrary, a claimant would still need to prove
necessity for the easement at the time of the separation of the dominant and servient estates, as
well as great present necessity. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 483. Moreover, an easement by necessity
would only exist as long as there is adequate necessity for the easement.
2.

There is Necessity For the Easement Claimed bv Backmans.
Backmans proved, and the District Court found, that the properties relevant to this

litigation were commonly owned by the United States. R. Vol. 11, p. 282. If this Court holds that
common ownership by the United States is sufficient to establish unity of title, then the
examination turns to whether necessity for an easement existed at the time of severance and
whether there is a great present necessity for the easement.
As noted, above, the District Court made a factual finding that the Backman
Property is legally landlocked and has always been legally landlocked. R. Vol. 11, p. 268.
Backmans submit that the District Court's findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity"
element for an easement by necessity.
In Cordwell, the Court of Appeals examined the burden of proof for establishing
the elements of necessity at the time of severance and great present necessity. The court stated
that a claimant must "establish by competent evidence that the [proposed] route. . . was at the
time of severance - and still is - the only reasonable means of access to" the claimant's property.
105 Idaho at 81. The court explained that this burden entailed proof that another route at issue in
the case "was not reasonably adequate." Id. Mere inconvenience is not sufficient. Id. The court
stated that in its analysis, "substantial inconvenience may be an important factor, but it must be
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weighed against the inconvenience and possible damage that could result to the [servient estate
owners] as a result of imposing an easement across their property." Id.
Backmans proved their property has always been "legally landlocked" and set
forth an existing route that had been used for over seventy (70) years to access the Backman
Property. Backmans proved there has never been legal access to the Backman Property since the
date the Backman Property was first patented by the United States Government.

The

District Court found the Backman Property was historically and is presently landlocked, and that
unless the District Court ordered access, the Backman Property would remain landlocked.
R. Vol. 11, p. 268. This Court should hold that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" element and hold that Backmans are entitled to
an easement by necessity over and across Turtle Rock RoaUSyringa Creek Road, and the three
extensions, onto the Backman Property and remand to the District Court to determine the scope
of the easement.
B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Backmans' Private Condemnation Claim.
At trial, Backmans sought legal access to their landlocked property through private

condemnation. The District Court denied Backmans' claim on the grounds that access to the
Backman Property was not "reasonably necessary" and that there was evidence of other
"physical" routes- not legal or available routes- to the Backman Property.

R. Vol. 11,

p. 291-93. The District Court's rulings were in error and the case should be remanded.
In Idaho, there is a two part test to determine if access can be condemned by a private
party. Erickron v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 910 (1979). First, a party must establish that the
condemnation is for a public purpose.

Second, condemnation of an access must be

reasonably necessary, in that there are no other reasonably convenient and adequate routes that
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can be used to access the property. Id. If these elements are satisfied, the court should determine
the scope of access to be condemned and compensation.
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may be
taken for a public use, which includes any "use necessary to the complete development of the
material resources of the state, or the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, is hereby
declared to be a public use and subject to the remlation and control of the state."
[Emphasis added.] The Idaho Legislature adopted Idaho Code § 7-701 defining, pursuant to the
Idaho Constitution, the public uses for which condemnation could and should be utilized.
Idaho Code § 7-701 provides that the "right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the
following public uses: . . . Bvroads, leadine. from highways to residences and farms."
[Emphasis added.] Idaho Code

5 7-701(5).

Idaho courts have specifically endorsed a private

party's right to condemn a right-of-way from a public highway to landlocked residences and
farms. Ericlwlon v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907 (1979) ; McKenney v. Anselmo, 91 Idaho 118 (1966);

Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266 (1950); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71 (Ct.App. 1983) .
Idaho Code § 7-704 states that before a taking of a right of access can occur, ihe access
must be necessary. Idaho courts have interpreted this statute to mean that a col~denlnorowning
other properties abutting public roads must prove strict necessity for the access. Cordwell,
105 Idaho at 80. On the other hand, a condemnor whose property is legally landlocked must
prove only the requested access is reasonable necessity for a taking.

Id.; Erickson,

99 Idaho at 910.
In this case, the District Court ruled that condemning access to the Backman Property so
that one (I) residence (house) could be built on each of the five (5) 20-acre parcels was not
reasonably necessary. R. Vol. 11, p. 297. In making that ruling, the District Court confused the
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stated two part test and improperly focused on whether the intended use of the Backman
Property was "reasonably necessary7'- not whether access to the Backman Property was
reasonably necessary for the public purpose. This was in error.
Idaho law unequivocally provides that if the use of the property for which access is
sought is for residences, it is a public purpose. Idaho Code 9 7-701(5). The District Court
should have focused on whether access was reasonably necessary to get to the proposed

residences - not whether the use of the Backman Property for residences was necessary. The
District Court should have only decided whether there was any other access into the property that
would preclude condemnation of an easement.
In finding that Backmans' proposed development is not "reasonably necessary," the
District Court noted that the Backman Property is currently vacant land and that Backmans
desired to build more than one (1) residence on the Backman Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 291-92.
Idaho Code § 7-701(5) , however, is not limited to providing access to existing residences.
In fact, such a limitation would be illogical. A claimant is not able to build a residence without
access. To limit Idaho Code 5 7-701(5) to permit access to only existing residences would be to
condone trespass for the purposes of building residences on vacant property.

Further,

Idaho Code 5 7-701(5) states that byroads to "residences," not the singular "residence," is a
public use justifying condemnation. Backmans' proposed use of the Backrnan Property is no
more invasive and no more dense than the use of Defendants' properties in Section 7; both
Section 7 and Section 8 would contain single family residences on ten (10) to twenty (20) acre
parcels.
Idaho public policy supports the cultivation and occupancy of lands and is against leaving
properties landlocked.

Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79 (quoting Burley Brick& Sand Co.,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 20
1:\1547.111WPEAL\Appellants'Brief
l.doc

102 Idaho at 335). Backmans proved that they intended to utilize their property for residences,
an acknowledged public purpose, and sought an easement for that purpose. Their stated purpose
is allowed under Idaho law. The only question left for the District Court to decide was whether
there was alternative access, compensation - which the District Court never reached - and the
scope of the easement - which the District Court never reached.
1.

There Are No Alternative Routes Available to Access the Backman Property.
The District Court also denied Backmans' claim to condemn an easement because

it characterized Redtail Hawk RoadIInspiration Way as an "available altemate route." R. Vol. 11,
p. 294. The District Court erred in determining that Redtail Hark Road/Inspiration Way is an
alternative route that is available to Backmans because the record conclusively establishes that
the route is not available to Backmans.
As is set forth above, a condemnor must prove that alternative means of access
are not available or are not reasonably adequate or sufficient for the condemnor's purposes.
Erickson, 99 Idaho at 910. Idaho courts have denied condemnation claims based on available
altemate routes where a condemnor had a license to use an alternate route, Erickson,
99 Idaho at 910; where a condemnor had a legal right-of-way for ingress and egress that was
"reasonably convenient," Eisenbarth, 70 Idaho at 270; and where a condemnor did not have an
easement over two alternative existing roads, but had never been denied the right to use them,
McKenney, 91 Idaho at 122.
In Cordwell, an easement by necessity case, the court analogized the standard
used for establishing necessity in an easement by necessity case to the standard employed in
cases seeking private condemnation. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 80. The court in Cordwell quoted
from Erickson, 99 Idaho at 910, in stating that "the burden of proving necessity for taking land is
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upon the condemnor, but he need only prove a reasonable and not an absolute, [sic] necessity.. ..
It was then incumbent upon [claimants] to prove that the alternative means of access were not
available to them or that such means of access were not reasonably adequate or sufficient for
their purposes." Id. In Cordwell, the court found that the claimant had reasonable alternative
access justifying the court's denial of claimant's easement by necessity claim. I05 Idaho at 81.
There, the alternative access consisted of a series of public roads that circumvented the property
the claimant sought to condemn. Id. at 81.
In all of the cases discussed above, alternative access was legally available to the
claimant. In this case, however, the uncontroverted evidence was that Backmans are barred from
using Redtail Hawk Road. Defendants have not advocated, and do not advocate, Redtail Hawk
Road as an available alternative access to the Backman Property. The evidence produced at trial
was that Defendants maintained Redtail Hawk Road as a private road. Plaintiffs Exhibits 36, 39.
The Defendants owning property along Redtail Hawk Road who testified at trial all testified that
Redtail Hawk Road and Inspiration Way are private roads. Tr. p. 301, L. 17-25, p. 302, L. 1-3;
p. 453, L. 9-23, p. 463, L. 9-25, p. 562, L. 15-25, p. 563, L. 1-5, p. 617, L. 11-21. Moreover,
Defendants have explicitly prohibited Backmans' use of Redtail Hawk Road by recording
instruments in the public record and by sending correspondence to Backmans. Plaintiffs'
Exhibits 36-41.
This Court has never characterized access that a claimant is barred from using as
"reasonable alternative access." Such a holding would contravene the strong public policy of the
State of Idaho against landlocked property. Thus, the District Court's characterization of Redtail
Hawk Road as available alternative access is a misapplication of Idaho law.
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C.

At Trial, The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law Bv Misapplying
"Presumptions" Not Relevant to Backmaus' Prescriptive Easement Claim.
Backmans presented evidence to the District Court sufficient to satisfy the elements of a

prescriptive easement claim. Backmans proved that Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa
Creek Road, and the three extensions, was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted,
adverse and under a claim of riglit, with the actual and imputed knowledge of the owners in
Section 7 for over five (5) years. The District Court correctly recognized the basic elements of a
prescriptive easement claim, but misapplied numerous presumptions not relevant to the facts in
the record and denied Backmans' prescriptive easement claim.

1.

This Court Disfavors the Use of "Presumptions" and "Burden Shifting" in
Prescriptive Easement Cases.
This Court recently decided two prescriptive easement cases in which certain

"presumptions" were applied. Beckstead v. Price, ID S.Ct. June 17, 2008 (see, Addendum,

w);
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474 (2006) .

In both Beckstead and Hughes, this Court

emphasized a need for courts to focus "simply on whether the five prescriptive easement
elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them," rather than focusing on whether
certain presumptions applied, burdens shifted, and whether burdens were met considering the
application of multiple presumptions. Beckstead, p. 6; Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. Thus, rather
than engaging in a cumbersome analysis of various presumptions that may arise in light of the
evidence, the Court in Beckstead and Zfughes simply considered whether the elements of a
prescriptive easement had been proved.
As in Beckstead and Hughes, the District Court in this case engaged in a
cumbersome analysis utilizing several presumptions to reach its decision. As is set forth herein,
the District Court improperly applied those presumptions and improperly shifted the burden of
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proof. This Court, therefore, should remand the District Court's decision to the District Court for
a decision as to whether Backmans presented evidence sufficient to prove the elements of a
prescriptive easement claim without resort to obsolete "presumptions."

2.

The District Court Erred in Characterizing Powers's Use of the Roadways in
Ouestion After 1996 as "Public."
The District Court ruled that Powers (Backmans' predecessor-in-interest)

conducted an "extensive and fairly continuous logging operation" on the Backman Property Erom
1994 through 1996 by way of access from Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three
extensions. R. Vol. 11, p. 273-274. The District Court, however, characterized Powers's use of
the roadways in question after 1996 as "public" and, therefore, not "open and notorious." Id.
While not stated in the District Court's decision, the District Court appears to apply the "public
use exception." The District Court, however, did not make any findings that persons besides
Powers used the subject roadways after Powers's purchase of the Backman Property in 1994.
The District Court made no finding that the "public" was using the roadways in question. The
District Court's findings were in error.
In Hughes, the Court reviewed the district court's application of the "public use
exception" to a prescriptive easement claim. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. The Iiughes Court
explained that the "public use exception" pertains to the prescriptive easement element that the
owner of the servient estate has actual or imputed knowledge of the claimant's use. Id.
The Court quoted Hall v. Stuawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112 (Ct.App. 1985):
Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse
claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the
general public, individual acquisition of prescriptive easements
has generally been held impossible. In such a case, the
claimant must perform some act whereby the adverse nature of
the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient estate.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 24
1:\1547.11lWPEALMppellants'
Brief i.doc

Id. The Court reasoned that a claimant must somehow differentiate its use of the claimed
easement from the use made of the easement by the general public as a matter of common sense
and fairness. Id. The Court explained that "[wlhen the claimant is using the land along with
members of the general public, it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner
that the claimant is making an adverse claim." Id.
The Court noted the testimony at trial that evidenced that use of the claimed
prescriptive easement by the public was "common knowledge," "common practice," and that
"everybody did it." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho at 481-82 (2006). The easement was regarded
as "neighborhood access" to a ski mountain. Id. at 482. The Court held that "the district court's
finding that there was public use of the path was based on substantial and competent
evidence. . ." The Court reasoned that once public use of the easement is established, a claimant
must present evidence of some "independent act signifying the adverse claim to the owner."

Id. at 482.
Here, the District Court erred in characterizing Powers's use of Turtle Rock Road/
Syringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, after 1996 to get to his own private property as
use by the "public." The District Court incorrectly focused on Powers's use of his property and
not his use of the easement. There was no evidence presented of any person other than Powers
using the roadways after 1994. Thus, there was no evidence of any "public use" to which the
District Court could compare Powers's use in determining whether or not Powers's use was, in
fact, of a public nature.
As the Court's analysis in Hughes directs, application of the public use exception
must be predicated upon some findings as to the use of the subject property by members &the
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general public. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481-82. It is only upon a finding of use by the general
public that corresponds with the claimant's use that the burden then shifts to the claimant to
prove some independent act indicating to the owner that the claimant is making an adverse claim
to the subject property. Id. at 482. In the case at hand, there is an absence of any evidence, let
alone evidence that could be characterized as substantial and competent, supporting the
District Court's finding that Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and the
three extensions, was "public" or that the "public" used the road.
Further, even if evidence of use by the public had been presented, the
uncontroverted evidence regarding Powers's use proves that, unlike members of the public at
large, Powers used Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, in a unique
manner - to access his private property, now the Backman Property. In Hughes, members of the
public had used the path to access property that was open to the public- the ski mountain.

Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481-82. There was no evidence in the record that members of the general
public were using the subject roads to access someone else's private property or any public
property.
The District Court improperly focused on the nature of Powers's use of the
Backman Property, rather than his use of Turtle Rock RoadSyringa Creek Road and the three
extensions. The public use exception applies to the requirement that a servient owner have
actual or imputed knowledge of a claimant's adverse claim.# Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481. The
test for establishing a prescriptive easement can focus only on the use a claimant makes of the
servient owner's property, not his own property. To hold otherwise would impose a burden on a
31

As noted, above, the District Court appears to have applied the public use exception to the open
and notorious element of a prescriptive easement claim. R. Vol. 11, p. 273-74. Later in the
Memorandum Opinion, however, the District Court applied the public use exception to the
elements of notice to the sel-vient owner and adverse and hostile use. R. Vol. 11, p. 274.
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servient owner to discover activities occurring outside the boundaries of his or her property.
Powers's use of his own property is relevant only to the determination of the scope of the
prescriptive easement once it has been held to have been created. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt,
98 Idaho 633, 638 (1977). The District Court's consideration of Powers's end use of the
Backman Property to make a finding concerning Powers's use of Turtle Rock RoadISyringa
Creek Road, and the three extensions, was in error.

3.

The District Court Erred in Applying the Wild and Unenclosed Lands
Presumption in Finding That Use of Turtle Rock RoadISvringa Creek Road,
and the Three Extensions, Prior to Powers's Ownership Was Permissive.
Under Idaho law, if a claimant establishes use that is open, notorious, continuous

and uninterrupted for the statutory period, even without evidence of how the use of a claimed
easement began, the use by the claimant is presumed adverse. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700,
702-03 (1998). The District Court ruled that use of the claimed easement by Powers and his
predecessors was permissive. The District Court made that finding not by looking at any
evidence of how the use of the roadways in question began, but by applying presumptions that
were not applicable.
The District Court ruled that "at least prior to the 1990s, the Court finds that the
relevant portions of the Syringa Creek drainage consisted of wild and unenclosed land."

R. Vol. 11, p. 278. Thus, the District Court applied the rebutlable presumption that use of wild
and unenclosed land is permissive. Id. Applying this presumption, the District Court stated:
Because the land in question was essentially open to anyone,
and was freely and openly used by members of the general
public; and because a logging operation, in and of itself, and
particularly in wild and unenclosed timberlands, does not
establish an adverse use; there is insufficient evidence in this
record of independent, decisive acts indicating separate and
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exclusive use of Syringa Creed Road by owners of the onehundred twenty (120) acres in Section 8 sufficient to rebut the
presumption of permissive use.

Id. The District Court's focus on the use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three
extensions, prior to 1994 - prior to Powers's ownership of the Backman Property - is in error.
The fact that the lands in Sections 7 and 8 were wild and unenclosed prior to the 1990s is
irrelevant to the determination as to whether Powers's use from 1994 satisfied the elements of a
prescriptive easement claim.
Where an alleged easement crosses wild and unenclosed lands, there is a
rebuttable presumption that use of such lands is permissive, and the burden of proving adversity
with evidence of "independent, decisive acts" shifts to the claimant. Hodgins v. Sales, I39 Idaho
225, 232 (2003). Here, the District Court applied the wild and unenclosed lands presumption
and found that any use prior to Powers's use was permissive. The District Court limited its
finding, however, stating that the wild and unenclosed lands presumption would only apply prior
to the 1990s. R. Vol. 11, p. 278. After the 1990s, Section 7 was being privately developed and
was not wild and unenclosed. Thus, when Powers bought the Backman Property in 1994, the
wild and unenclosed lands presumption would not apply.
The District Court relied upon its finding that the relevant lands in the Syringa
Creek drainage were wild and unenclosed prior to the 1990s to hold that Powers's use of Turtle
Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, commenced as a permissive use.
Such reliance is in error.

Use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three

extensions, after 1990 cannot be presumed to be permissive. This Court should reverse the
District Court's decision and remand the case for a determination as to whether Powers's use of
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the subject roads after 1994 satisfied the elements of a prescriptive easement claim, free of the
application of any presumptions.
4.

The District Court Erred in Aaplving the Common Use Rule in Determining
That Use of Turtle Rock RoadISvrin~a Creek Road, and the Three
Extensions, Prior to Powers's Use Was Permissive.
The District Court erred in applying the common use rule to determine that any

use of Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, was permissive prior to
Powers's purchase of the Backman Property in 1994. The District Court cited Melendez v. Hintz,
111 Idaho 401 (Ct.App. 1986), for the proposition that "where a road has been built on the
servient estate, and then used by the dominant estate, such common use is not adverse."
R. Vol. 11, p. 279. The District Court's application of the common use rule on the facts of this
case is in error.
The Melendez reasoning does not apply to the facts of this case. Melerzdez
involved a neighbor's claim for a prescriptive easement over the owner's driveway. 111 Idaho
at 138. The Court of Appeals cited to Simmons v. Peukins, 63 Idaho 136 (1941), for the
proposition that "the rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs a
way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way
interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or permission." Id. at 140.
The Court of Appeals in Melendez explained this presumption of permissive use in an effort to
define the limits of its application. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
There should be no presumption that the use originated
adversely to the owner unless the use itself constitutes some
invasion or infringement upon the rights of an owner. Where
one person merely uses a roadway in common with his
neighbor, without damage to the roadway, without interfering
with the neighbor's use of the roadway, and where the
neighbor has established and maintained the roadwav on his
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property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion
is made into the owner's dominion over his property.

Id. at 141 (emphasis added) .
Here, there is no evidence that the owners in Section 7 constructed the roads in
Section 7 for their own benefit. The District Court did not make any findings as to the original
purpose for the construction of the roads in Section 7. In fact, the District Court stated that "the
history of the spur road construction is vague," and that "whether the roads were built to log
Section 7 first and then extended to Section 8 is a logical assumption, but only an assumption."
R. Vol. 11, p. 279. The common use finding that gives rise to a presumption of permissiveness is
predicated upon a finding that an owner has constructed roads for its own convenience on its
own property. Melendez, 111 Idaho at 140. Although the District Court stated that it may be
"logical" to assume that the roads were built to log Section 7 first, and thus for the convenience
of Section 7 first, such a finding would be merely an assumption. Thus, the opposite could be
true; that the roads were built first to log Section 8. The fact that Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa
Creek Road, and the three extensions, may have later been used by owners in Section 7 and
Section 8 are not sufficient facts that give rise to application of the rule that common use is
presumptively permissive use. Rather, there must be a finding that the roads were established
first for the convenience ofthe owner of the servient estate.
For these reasons, the District Court's finding of common use is unsupported by
the evidence in the record. This Court should reverse the District Court's decision and remand
the case for a determination as to whether Backmans proved the elements of their prescriptive
easement claim, free of the application of any assumptions.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 30
1:\1547.11tWPEAL\Appellants' Brief l.doc

5.

Backmans Proved the Elements of Their Prescriptive Easement Claim.
The record contains ample evidence to support a finding that Powers's use of

Turtle Rock Road/Syringa Creek Road, and the extensions, was open and notorious, continuous
and unintempted, adverse and under a claim of right, with the actual and imputed knowledge of
the owners in Section 7 for at least five (5) years.
Powers's use was open and notorious. The requirement that use be "open and
notorious" serves to afford the owner ofthe servient estate reasonable notice to challenge the use
of the servient estate owner's properly. 4 Powell on Real Property,

5 34.10[2][fJ

(2000). The

use must be sufficiently open and notorious that a reasonable person would have discovered its
occurrence. Id.
Following the initial logging operation (which the District Court did find was
open and notorious [R. Vol. 11, p. 16]), Powers continued to maintain and use the roads accessing
the Backman Property. Powers testified that he did a lot of "driving maintenance" on the roads
and periodically graded them. Tr. p. 224, L. 1-5. The State of Idaho required Powers to remove
the wooden bridges over Syringa Creek from the Lower and Middle Roads. In order to pull the
bridges out, Powers hauled in a backhoe. Tr. p. 221, L. 20 - p. 222, L. 10. Powers also planted
willows in the slide area. He testified that for approximately one year, he would use the roads
twice a week to access the Backman Property to water the willows. Tr. p. 226, L. 14-17.
Powers also installed a culvert on the Middle Road after the end of the initial
logging operation. Powers testified that he installed the culvert because "I wanted to be able to
drive onto the property through that middle road." Tr. p. 223, L. 24-25. Approximately one and
one-half year after the initial logging operations, Powers built a skid trail off of the Middle Road
into the northeast corner of his property. Tr. p. 224, L. 14-16. He testified that he brought in his
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bulldozer to build this skid trail from the Middle Road all of the way into Section 8. Tr. p. 224,

L. 14 -p. 225, L. 3.
Powers testified that he used the roads to access the Backman Property to burn
slash piles and to monitor erosion control measures he had implemented.

Tr. p. 226,

L. 11 - p. 277, L. 14. Beyond logging, Powers continued to use Turtle Rock RoaaSyringa Creek
Road, and the three extensions, to access his property for recreational pursuits until he sold it.
Tr. p. 261. L. 18 - p. 264, L. 23. Powers routinely picked berries, hunted on the property and
also camped on the property on at least two occasions.

T. p. 225, L. 17 -p. 226. L. 10.

He testified that from 1996 to 2004 he hunted white-tail deer on the Backman Property.
Tr. p. 262, L. 16 - p. 262, L. 13. He also hunted grouse on the property intermittently during late
fall each year. Tr. p. 263, L. 14-17. Powers testified that from 1998 to 2004, he would visit the
Backman Property at least once per month. Tr. p. 264, L. 18-23.
The same evidence supporting characterization of Powers's use of Turtle Rock
RoaaSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, as open and notorious supports a finding
that Powers's use was contiuuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period. "For a use to be
'continuous' does not mean that it must be 'constant.' . . ." 7 Thomvson on Real Property,
$60.03(b)(6)(viii) at 477 (1994). "Continuity requires use often enough to provide notice to the
potential servient owner, and 'uninterrupted' means that the use is not 'interrupted by the act of
the owner of the land or by voluntary abandonment by the party claiming the right."' Id.
Powers's testimony supported the continuity of his use of Section 7 to access the Backman
Property and that his use was not interrupted for over five ( 5 ) years.
The evidence in the record also supports a finding that Powers's use was adverse
and under a claim of right. Adverse use "under a claim of right" refers to "use without

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 32
I:\1547.111MPPEAL\AppeIIantsts
Brief I.doc

recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient estate." West v. Smith,95 Idaho 550, 557
(1973). In Hodgins, the Supreme Court stated that the analysis must focus on the nature of the
claimant's use of the subject property. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231-32. Powers's trial testimony
regarding his use of Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, supports a
finding that this use was without recognition of the right of the owners in Section 7. Powers
believed he had a right to use the roads in Section 7 and acted accordingly.
The owners in Section 7 had actual and imputed knowledge that Powers claimed a
right to use Turtle Rock Roadsyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions. The actual or
imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient estate requirement is closely related to the
requirement that the use be open and notorious. In essence, the owner must either have
"knowledge and acquiescence" or the use must be sufficiently "open, notorious, visible, and
uninterrupted that howledge will be prestuned."

5 60.03@)(6)(viii)at p. 445 (1994).

7 Thomoson on Real Property,

Indeed, the District Court seemed to analyze jointly whether

Powers's use was open and notorious, with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the
servient estate.
Powers testified that he told Dr. Lawrence that he would be bringing in equipment
when he started working on the roads in Section 7. Tr. p. 255, L. 12-19. Powers unloaded all of
the heavy equipment he used for road work and logging on Dr. Lawrence's property. Tr. p. 213,
L. 15 -p. 215, L. 15. Powers also introduced himself to Mr. Sowders, who lived near Syringa
Creek Road in the northern part of Section 7. Tr. p. 253, L. 8-14. These owners certainly had
actual knowledge of Powers's use of the roads in Section 7. Regarding Powers's use of land in
Section 7 owned by others, the record contains sufficient evidence to impute knowledge based
on Powers's extensive use and maintenance of the roads across Section 7. Again, the evidence
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showing that Powers's use was open and notorious should also be applied to find that Powers's
use of Turtle Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road, and the three extensions, was with the actual or
imputed knowledge of the owners in Section 7.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should remand the case to the District
Court with instructions that it refrain from applying any presumptions and determine whether the
evidence in the record supports a finding that Backmans proved the elements of their prescriptive
easement claim.

D.

The District Court Erred In Failine To Combine Easement By Necessity. Private
Condemnation And/or Prescriptive Easement Theories To Provide Access To The
Landlocked Backman Property.
The District Court erred in declining to combine easement by necessity, private

condemnation andlor prescriptive easement theories to provide Backmans with access to the
landlocked Backman Property. The District Court did not cite to any authority prohibiting the
combination of legal theories to provide access. The District Court stated simply that "the Court
declines to apply a combination of the three theories of the plaintiff to provide an access where
no access can be established under a single theory." R. Vol. 11, p. 297-98. The District Court
erred in declining to combine easement by necessity and prescriptive easement theories because,
contrary to the District Court's reasoning, such a combination would not impermissibly expand
the scope of either theory. In addition, the District Court erred in analyzing only whether
Backmans could combine the theories of prescriptive easement and easement by necessity. The
District Court should have also considered private condemnation, and whether that theory could
be combined with an easement by necessity to provide the best and most reasonable access to the
Backman Property.
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The Backman Property was landlocked when the United States Government patented the
land and remained landlocked when Humbird owned the Backman Property and sold its adjacent
lands. In 1943, Humbird conveyed its lands in Section 7 to Modig. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22. The
District Court stated that "[all1 parties agree that, at the very most, the easement by necessity
claim for Section 8 is limited to crossing the Modig parcel (in the east half of the east half of
Section 7). Because of the unity of title requirement, easement by necessity fails as to the
McKenna and Bessler properties in the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 7."
R. Vol. 11, p. 295-96. Thus, the District Court found that there was unity of title in the Modig
parcel in Section 7 and the Backman Property in Section 8 until Humbird sold the Modig parcel
in 1943. As the District Court notes, the McKenna and Bessler properties were never included
within the Modig parcel. Therefore, an easement by necessity premised on the unity of title in
Humbird would not afford access across the properties presently owned by Defendants Bessler
and McKennas.

However, access across these properties could be provided by either a

prescriptive easement or by private condemnation.
In declining to "bridge the gap" between the Modig parcel and the public Baldy
Mountain Road with a prescriptive easement, the District Court cited to Roberts v. Swim for the
proposition that "easement by necessity is based upon the severance of a parcel from a common
ownership parcel that deprives the severed parcel of legal access to a public road." R. Vol. 11,
p. 296 (citing 117 Idaho 9 [Ct.App. 19891). The District Court continued by stating that
"[wlhen Humbird sold the Modig parcel in 1943, the Modig parcel did not have direct access
upon a public road. The access out to Baldy Mountain Road would only be prescriptive, and, on
this record, for logging only." R. Vol. 11, p. 296. The District Court appears to have declined to
combine an easement by necessity over the old Modig parcel with a prescriptive easement over
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the McKenna and Bessler properties based on its determination that such combination would
improperly expand the scope of both theories. Id. Easement by necessity would be improperly
expanded because there was no public road providing access to the Modig parcel. Prescriptive
easement would be improperly expanded because a prescriptive easement, if it existed, would be
limited to logging, and Backmans claimed a prescriptive easement for access to residences.
First, the District Court's refusal to combine easement by necessity and prescriptive
easement theories is in error. The District Court's citation to Roberts does not accurately state
the law applicable to easements by necessity. A public road need not exist at the time of
severance of the dominant and servient estates. The portion of Roberts cited by the District
Court cites to Cordwell v. Smith,105 Idaho 71 (Ct. App. 1983) . Cordwell stated that:
[Tlhe existence of a way of necessity does not depend upon what
use the common owner was making of the roads existing at the
time of severance. Such easement could arise even if at the time of
severance there was no road across the mantor's wrowerty to the
part conveyed. Thus, a remote grantee of land not being used at
the time of severance-as in the present case-may nevertheless,
when the use becomes necessary to the enjoyment of his property,
claim the easement under this remote deed.
105 Idaho at 79 (emphasis added) . Easement by necessity does not depend on the existence of
access from the Modig parcel to a public road. Therefore, combination of easement by necessity
with a prescriptive easement over the McKenna and Bessler properties would not impermissibly
expand the scope of an easement by necessity. For the reasons set forth in the section analyzing
Backmans' prescriptive easement claim, whether the facts in the record supporl Backmans'
prescriptive easement claim, as well as the scope of such easement, would be determined upon
remand of the case to the District Court,
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Second, the District Court erred in failing to consider whether a combination of easement
by necessity and private condemnation would provide the best and most reasonable access to the
Backman Property. For the reasons set forth, above, the District C o w could find an easement
by necessity over the old Modig parcel. Private condemnation is reasonably necessary as the
Backman Property is landlocked. Based upon the trial testimony of Dr. Folsom and the
Backman Roads Investigation, there was no historical access road to the Backman Property,
except through Section 7. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42.

For the reasons set forth in the section

analyzing Backmans' private condemnation claim, there is no alternative access avaiIable to
Backmans.
Defendants did not present and the District Court did not cite any authority requiring
access to property to be confined to a single legal theory. A combination of legal theories to
provide access would not be unprecedented as people frequently travel some combination of
public roads, private roads, easements and licenses to reach their properties. This Court should
reverse the District Court's decision declining to combine the theories of easement by necessity,
prescriptive easement andlor private condemnation, and hold that combining theories to provide
access is permissible.

The case should then be remanded to the District Court for a

determination as to the theories that should be used and the scope of the access based on the facts
and circumstances ofthis case.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The Backman Property is landlocked and at the mercy of the adjacent landowners who
have rehsed to grant Backmans an easement. Public policy in Idaho supports the use of
property. The Disttict Court erred in denying Backmans' easement by necessity, private
condemnation and prescriptive easement claims. The District Court also erred in declining to
combine such theories to provide access to the Backman Property. This Court should reverse the
District Court's decision and hold that Backmans are entitled to a prescriptive easement or
easement by necessity, or to condemn an easement to access their landlocked property.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26" day of August 2008.
MEULEMAN MOLLERW LLP

w
Attornevs For Auwellants
Bob Backman a;& Rhonda Backman
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33473
M. DALE BECKSTEAD and GAYLE )
BECKSTEAD, husband and wife,
)
)

Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Respondents, )
)
v.
)

Pocatello, April 2008 Term

BLAINE PRICE, JOANN PRICE, LAZY E., j
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and )
JOHN DOES 1-10,
)

Filed: June 17,2008

2008 Opinion No. 84

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

)

Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants. )

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Oneida County. Hon. Don L. Warding, District Judge.
District court order on prescriptive easement, affirmed in part, vacated in part and
remanded.
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chtd., Pocatello, for appellants. Lowell N. I-lawkes and Ryan
Scott Lewis argued.
Maguire & Kress, Pocatello, for respondents. David R. Kress and Matthew Luke
Kinghorn argued.

BURDICK, Justice
Appellants Blaine Price, JoAnn Price, Lazy E., LLC, and John Does 1-10 (collectively
the Prices) appeal a district court order which decrees the existence of a prescriptive easement
over their land in favor of Respondents M. Dale and Gayle Beckstead. On appeal, the Prices
raise several issues including whether the district court erroneously concluded the Becksteads
have a prescriptive easement, whether the determination of the scope of the easement was
erroneous, and whether the Prices' right to due process was violated. We affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Becksteads own approxilnately 760 acres of land (the Beckstead Property) in Oneida
County. The Becksteads purchased the Beckstead Property in 1996. The Prices own two parcels

of property: the Price Property and the Frederickson Property. Off of the paved highway, there is
a road that runs across the Price Property and the Frederickson Property and then connects to the
Beckstead Property. The road is not a driveway, but leads to a fork in the road that turns right
into the driveway going to the Prices' residence or left up to the Beckstead Property.
The Becksteads and the Prices had a friendly relationship until about 2001. After some
contentious encounters and trouble with gates that the Prices placed on the road, the Becksteads
initiated a quiet title suit. After a three-day court trial, the district court ruled the Becksteads met
the prescriptive easement requirements. The Prices appeal.
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement involves
entwined questions of law and fact. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228
(2006). When this Court reviews a lower court's decision, it determines whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.

Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402,405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001). "A trial court's findings of
fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in
view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." Id. Findings of fact based on substantial and
competent evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of conflicting evidence.

Benninger v. DeriJeld, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). It is the province of
the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Id.
"[Wle exercise free review over the lower court's conclusion of law to determine whether
the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conciusions are sustained
by the facts found." Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406,34 P.3d at 1089.
111. ANALYSIS

The Prices argue that the Becksteads failed to establish they acquired a prescriptive
easement and that the scope of the easement granted is excessive. The Prices also argue the
district court erred by failing to award them contribution and by ordering the locking and
removal of various gates. The Prices further argue they were denied due process and that the
district court entered an erroneous order when considering the Becksteads' second contempt
motion. Both parties assert they are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. We address
each issue in turn.

A. Existence of the Prescriptive Easement
After the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Becksteads, the Prices moved
for reconsideration. The district court decided it would consider the information submitted
during the trial before ruling on the motion for reconsideration. After the three-day court trial,
the courl made written factual findings and concluded as a matter of law that based on those
findings, the Becksteads had a prescriptive easement. The Prices contend the facts do not
support a conclusion that the Becksteads have established any of the prescriptive easement
elements.
The requirements for a prescriptive easement have been clearly established in Idaho:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription
"must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which
is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3)
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of
the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales,
139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). The statutory period in question is
five years. I.C. 5 5-203; Weaver v. Sfafford, 134 Idaho 691, 698, 8 P.3d 1234,
1241 (2000). A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse
use by the claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may
combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the
requisite five continuous years of adverse use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76
P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous,
uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without
evidence of how the use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse
and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d
383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980
(1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that
the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or
agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680,
946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the
servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at
975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the
focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32,76 P.3d at 975-76.

Akers v D.L. White Consru., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). "A prescriptive
right cannot be obtained if the use of the servient estate is by permission of the landowner."

Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 439, 443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004) (quoting Wood, 131 Idaho at 702,
963 P.2d at 385).
The Prices assert the district court should have only considered the continuous and
uninterrupted use of the roadway by Dale Beckstead; the Prices argue Gayle is not an owner of
the property and that her use or the use of any other nonowners cannot he used to establish the

prescriptive easement. However, this argument ignores the extensive body of Idaho law that
considers various users of the easement to the degree they show the easement was being used by
the landowner. See, e.g., Benninger, 142 Idaho at 490, 129 P.3d at 1239 (use by visitors and
emergency service providers); Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406,34 P.3d at 1089 (use by neighbor and
his grandson, who were hired to cut grass on the property).
An easement "is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,
273,127 P.3d 167,176 (2005) (quoting Abbolt v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,548,
808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).

The district court found the

Becksteads used the land for recreational purposes, for grazing cattle, and for making
improvements to the Beckstead Property. Those types of uses will naturally include ingress and
egress for visitors and people hired to perform work on the property. Thus, the district court did
not err by considering the use of nonowners to the degree those nonowners showed use of the
easement by the landowner.
The district court found that the Becksteads continuously used the property each year
from 1996 through 2005, that the Becksteads at no time sought permission to use the road, and
that nearly all the use of the road can be observed from the Prices' residence. It is the province
of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. Here, the judge's weighing of
evidence and judgment on the credibility of the witnesses resulted in a favorable judgment for
the Becksteads. Though the Prices presented conflicting evidence, there is trial testimony that
sufficiently supports the district court's findings. Therefore, we hold the district court's factual
findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. Next, we must determine
whether the factual findings support the conciusions of law.
The district court concluded the Becksteads established they had a prescriptive easement
"for the purpose of ingress and egress to the Beckstead Property." "A party seeking to establish
the existence of an easement by prescription 'must prove by clear and convincing evidence use
of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and
uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge
of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period."' Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127
P.3d at 206 (quoting Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973).

The factual findings support a conclusion that the Becksteads' use of the road was open
and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted,' with the actual knowledge of the Prices, and for
the statutory period. Thus, the Becksteads raised the presumption their use was adverse. See id.
The burden then shifted to the Prices to show that the Becksteads' use was permissive, or by
virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. See id. (citing Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at
386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980). The district court determined the Prices
failed to present any "credible evidence that any person ever obtained or received permission
from [the Prices]

. . . ."

It was for the district court to determine the credibility of the witnesses,

Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238, and there is substantial and competent evidence

in the record to support a determination that the Becksteads never asked for nor received
permission to use the road. The factual findings by the district court sufficiently support its
conclusion that the Becksteads acquired a prescriptive easement.
The Prices nonetheless put forth other theories to support their contention that the
Becksteads did not show their use was adverse and under a claim of right.
1. The Hunter Rule
First, the Prices argue there was evidence the Becksteads' predecessors used the road by
permission. The Prices assert once there is permissive use, the use continues to be presumed
permissive unless there is unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of
hostile and adverse use and cite to Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 152, 953 P.2d 588, 592
(1998). We need not get to Hunter because here there was no evidence the Becksteads'
predecessors used the road by permission.
Shirlee Ward and her husband (the Wards) owned the Beckstead Property from 1980 to
1996. The Wards accessed the Beckstead Property from 1980 to 1985 without any leased
interest on land surrounding the Beckstead Property and without asking or receiving permission.
Between 1985 and the early 1990s the Wards leased the Price Property; the Wards never leased
the Frederickson Property. The Wards stopped leasing the Price Property in 1993 but continued
to access the Beckstead Property.

'

The Prices claim because the Becksteads' use was only seasonal, it was not continuous and uninterrupted. First,
the cases cited by the Prices do not support their contention because they are factually dissimilar. See Brown, 140
Idaho at 443,95 P.3d at 61; Anderson, 136 Idaho at 406, 34 P.3d at 1089. Second, it is generally accepted that the
"continuous and unintempted" element does not require daily use or even monthly use. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements

Thus, there is evidence that during the time of the lease, the Wards had permission to use
the road to access the Price Property. However, prior to the lease, during the lease, and after the
lease, the Wards also owned the Beckstead Property and used the road to access that parcel of
land. There is no evidence showing the lease of the Price Property gave them permission to use
the road to access the Beckstead Property. Nor was there evidence that the road running through
the Price Property and the Frederickson Property was ever used permissively to access the
Beckstead Property. There is only evidence that there was permission to use the road to access
the Price Property, and here the Price Property is not the dominant estate. Hence, this evidence
does not show the claimant's use was permissive.
2. Use in Common
Second, the Prices argue that the Becksteads' use was merely in common with the Prices
and thus, a permissive use presumption arises rather than an adverse use presumption. In Idaho,
the adverse use presumption has been rebutted by evidence of "use of a driveway in common
with the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part
indicating a separate and exclusive use

. . . ."

Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980

(quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740,744 (1941)) (emphasis removed);
see also Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006).
A second exception to the adverse use presumption has been applied in Idaho: when "a

landowner 'constructs a way over [the land] for his own use and convenience, the mere use
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way o f . . .
permission."' Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho at 144,
118 P.2d at 744) (alteration in original). In Hughes, the parties cited these exceptions and argued
over whether the presumptions applied, whether the burdens shifted, and whether the latter
exception applies when the owner did not construct the way over the land. Id. This Court held
those two rules were simply an approach to determining whether the claimant had met the
elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Court stated a
desire to "disentangle Idaho prescriptive easement law" and "emphasize[d] the need for courts to
streamline their analysis by focusing simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements
have been satisfied based on the facts before them." Id. Here, the district court found that the

and Licenses $ 61 (2004). The acquisition of a prescriptive easement requires continuous use "according to the
nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." Id.

Becksteads did not seek or obtain permission from the Prices to use the road and that the Prices
recognized the Becksteads' right to use the road. There was evidence the Becksteads' use of the
road was adverse and under a claim of right. To the degree there was conflicting evidence, it
was the province of the district court to weigh that evidence. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129
P.3d at 1238. The district court's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Therefore, we hold the district court correctly concluded based on the facts before it that
the Becksteads met all of the prescriptive easement elements, and we affirm the district court's
conclusion that the Becksteads have a prescriptive easemenL2

B. Scope of the Easement
The Prices argue the scope of the easement is excessive as to uses and number of people.
The Prices argue the easement does not cover the use of certain types of vehicles, that the
easement does not extend to people invited by the Becksteads to the Beckstead Property, and that
Gayle Beckstead does not own the property and thus, cannot have a prescriptive easement.
Recognizing that "[plrescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[,]" this Court has
stated prescriptive rights "should be closely scrutinized and limited by the courts." Gibbens v.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,638, 570 P.2d 870,875 (1977). The scope of a prescriptive easement
is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101
Idaho 356, 359, 613 P.2d 367, 370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 570 P.2d at 875 (quoting
Bartholomew v. Staheli, 195 P.2d 824, 829 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). The holder of the
prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial increase or change of burden on the
servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d
at 829).
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive period there was no continuous
use of the various means of transportation named in the Becksteads' complaint: trucks, campers,
livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic, and heavy equipment needed to improve the

Thus, it is unnecessiuy to decide whether the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Becksteads was
procedurally proper. Below, the court granted summary judgment to the Becksteads as to the existence of the
prescriptive easement. However, after the Prices' motion to reconsider, the court allowed the issue to go to trial and,
based on findings made alter the hial, the district court concluded the Becksteads established the existence of a
prescriptive easement. We affirm the decision the district wurt made after the trial; consequently, the issue of
whether summary judgment was procedurally proper is moot. See Webb v. Webb,143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d
1267, 1270 (2006) (holding an issue is moot when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relieo.

Beckstead Property. In the past, this Court has not required the scope of the easement specify
particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have characterized
easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140 Idaho at 443-44, 95
P.3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope of the easement should include any reasonable means of
transportation for the character of use made during the prescriptive period.
The district court found the Becksteads used the easement during the prescriptive period
for recreational purposes, for grazing purposes, and for making improvements to the Beckstead
Property. This conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record.
Though the district court gave specific examples of which vehicles might use the road for the
purposes of recreation, grazing cattle, and making improvements, it did not express an intention
to limit the scope to those means of travel. We affirm the district court's finding that the
easement can be used for recreational purposes, grazing purposes, and for making improvements.
Furthermore, we clarify that the use of the easement is not limited to any specific vehicles or
types of vehicles and that the easement covers the use of any vehicles that would reasonably be
used to access the Beckstead Property for egress and ingress, recreating, grazing cattle, or
making improvements.
As to number of people, the Prices argue the district court erred by stating the easement
"extends to all of the Plaintiffs [sic] invitees . . . ."3 Instead, the Prices believe the district court
should have ordered the Becksteads to give the names of everyone that will visit the Beckstead
Property.
There is a difference between easements appurtenant and easements in gross. West v.

Smith,95 Idaho 550,556,511 P.2d 1326, 1332 (1973). An easement appurtenant is attached to a
dominant tenement. Id. A person does not hold an easement in gross by virtue of ownership in a
particular parcel of land; rather, an easement in gross is a personal right to use the land of
another. Id. An easement in gross is not assignable and applies to specific people and not to
guests or assignees. Id. Contrarily, an easement appurtenant "serves the owner of the dominant
estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230,

A review of the trial transcript shows that "invitee" was used broadly by the district court and the parties
throughout trial to indicate any person the Becksteads invite to their property, whether to perform work or as a social
guest. Therefore, the easement extends lo guests of theBecksteads coming to the property'for recreational purposes,
grazing purposes, or to improve the property, and it is unnecessary to remand in order to determine whether the
easement applies to invitees and licensees as defined by law.

76 P.3d at 974. When such an easement is created, "it becomes fixed as an appurtenance to the
real property, which is subject to the prescriptive use and may be claimed by a successor in
interest." Id. "In cases of doubt, Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Id.
Here, the easement the Becksteads acquired is not personal but is an easement
appurtenant that serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from
his rights in the land-it

provides access to the Beckstead Property. Therefore, it is not

necessary that the district court name specific people who can use the roadway to access the
Beckstead Property. The quantity of people using the easement to access the Beckstead Property
is not limited by names of people, but is limited by the swpe of the easement. To the degree the
use of the easement may begin to exceed the use made during the prescriptive period, the parties
can then litigate whether there has been an unlawful increase in the use of the easement. As
described in the district court's order, the declared scope of the easement does not exceed the use
made during the prescriptive period.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the district court name the individuals that will use the
easement, nor is it necessary that this Court "reverse the prescriptive easement granted to Gayle
Beckstead." The evidence the Becksteads presented established a prescriptive easement; the
prescriptive easement is appurtenant to the Beckstead Property and, thus, is attached to the land
and not to

individual^.^

Nonetheless, because the district court did not set out the width and length of the
easement, we remand the case back to the district court. "[Ilt is well settled under Idaho law that
any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, width,
length and location of the easement. This Court does not hesitate to remand cases because of an
inadequacy in the district court's description of an easement." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho
767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006) (internal citations omitted). On remand it will not be
necessary for the district court to specify the character of the easement, since it has already done
so. The determination of the width and length of the easement should take into account the
factual findings already made by the district court as those findings are supported by substantial
and competent evidence.

Those findings include that during the prescriptive period the

Moreover, regardless of whether Gayle is an actual owner of the Beckstead Property, we note that Dale clearly
owns the land and, thus, had standing to bring the quiet title suit. See Tungsten Holdings Inc., v. Drake, 143 Idaho

Becksteads used the easement for trucks, camper trailers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, and
transportation of necessary equipment and materials to make improvements on the Beckstead
Property and to the Frederickson road including a dump truck and grader.
In conclusion, we hold the district court did not err in pronouncing the scope of the
easement to be used for recreational purposes, grazing cattle purposes, and to make
improvements on the Beckstead Property. We also hold it is not necessary that the district court
order the Becksteads to provide names of everyone that will use the easement to access their
property. Finally, we remand the case to the district court for the limited purpose of setting out
the width and length of the easement.
C. Contribution for Maintenance
The Prices counterclaimed for contribution for their maintenance of the roadway. On
appeal, the Prices contend the district court erred in failing to consider their contribution claim
and that they are entitled to an award of contribution.
The owner of the servient estate does not have a duty to maintain the easement. Walker

v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,455,95 P.3d 69,73 (2004). The owner of the dominant estate has the
duty to maintain the easement even when the servient estate landowner uses the easement. Id. at
456, 95 P.3d at 74. "That duty requires the easement owner maintain, repair, and protect the
easement so as not to create an additional burden on the servient estate or an interference that
would damage the land, such as flooding of the servient estate." Id. However, the dominant
estate owner's duty to maintain does not require the dominant estate "to maintain and repair the
easement for the benefit of the servient estate." Id. When a servient estate owner seeks
contribution they must show the dominant estate owner's maintenance created an additional
burden or an interference that would damage the servient estate. Id.
[Albsent a showing that the easement owners' maintenance of the easement
created an additional burden or interference with the servient estate, the servient
estate cannot dictate the standard by which the easement should be maintained,
expend funds to maintain it to the level desired by the servient estate and then
seek reimbursement for those expenditures and contribution for future
expenditures from the easement owners.

Id.

69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006) ("Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to quiet title to an easement
appurtenant to that estate.").

There was evidence presented throughout the trial that the Prices expended money to
maintain the road. However, the Prices fail to make any arguments or point the Court to any
evidence showing the Becksteads' maintenance or lack thereof created an additional burden or
an interference causing damage to the Prices' land. The district court found the Becksteads
maintained the road and this is supported by testimony given throughout the trial.'

Since the

Prices fail to show the Becksteads' maintenance of the road created an additional burden or
interference with the servient estate causing the Prices to then perform maintenance, we hold the
Prices are not entitled to contribution for their maintenance of the road.

D. Gates
The Prices argue the district court erred in ordering the Prices to replace their wire gates
with metal swing gates, in ordering the locking of the front gate, and in ordering that a certain
gate be removed.
This Court has affirmed district court orders preventing the servient estate from
constructing or maintaining gates in a way which interferes with or limits the use of the
prescriptive easement by the dominant estate. See Lovitt v. Robidearn, 139 Idaho 322, 328-29,
78 P.3d 389, 395-96 (2003); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 640, 570 P.2d at 877. In Gibbens, this Court
held it was proper to impose on the dominant estate owners the expense of constructing and
maintaining gates necessary to protect the easement. Id. at 640, 570 P.2d at 877. However,

Gibbens does not require that all expenses associated with gates on the easement be absorbed by
the dominant estate owners. Rather, Gibbens looked at the specific facts of the case. See id. ("It
would seem proper in this case to require" the dominant estate to construct and maintain the
necessary gates). In Lovitt, this Court looked at whether the district court's order preventing the
servient estate from limiting the use of the easement by a locked gate was reasonable. 139 Idaho
at 328, 78 P.3d at 395. The Court noted the servient estate owner may choose to construct a gate
across an easement hut "[uJse of a gate, or any other method of regulating an easement, by the
owner of the servient estate must, however, be reasonable." Id. There, the district court's

Thus, the Prices' contention that the Becksteads have not maintained the easement lacks merit. Furthennore, there
is no support for the Prices' contention that maintenance of an easement requires the dominant estate owners to
insure or pay taxes on the easement. See Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 520, 365 P.2d 952, 955 (1961) (it is
necessaxy to pay taxes in order to adversely possess land, hut paying taxes is not necessary in order to acquire an
easement).

finding of reasonableness was affirmed when it was supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Id. at 329,78 P.3d at 396.
The district court's order includes the following:
The Court does recognize that the [Prices] do have a right to protect and
use their property, and as such the [Prices] may construct those gates which are
necessary for the use of the [Prices'] land. However, hased on the facts, it is
evident that the gate the [Prices] have placed near the gate leading to the
Beckstead Property has no purpose hut to harass and make it more difficult for the
[Becksteads] to access their property. As such the [Prices] [are] hereby
ORDERED to remove the gate.
Furthermore, it is evident that the high tension wire gates with the spikes
in the posts that the [Prices] have placed on the road serve no purpose other than
to harass and prevent the [Becksteads] from accessing their land and since there
has been no showing that a high tension wire gate is better than a metal swing
gate, it is ORDERED that these wire gates he removed and metal swing gates he
placed in their stead. Also the [Prices] may not lock these gates unless they
provide a key to the [Becksteads].
Finally, in order to prevent access or use of the road by those who are not
parties or invitees of the parties, the parties shall at shared expense place a gate at
the place where the road leaves the public highway, with a combination lock,
which will remain locked at all times. The parties may share the code with their
invitees.
Though the order does not specify which party must replace the high tension wire gates
with metal swing gates, apparently the Prices understood it was their responsibility to do so and
complied with the order. On appeal, the Prices argue they should not have had to hear the
expense of replacing the gates. However, the district court based its directive on finding that the
Prices' placed the high tension wire gates on the road in order to harass the Becksteads and
prevent them from using the easement to access their land. There is substantial and competent
evidence to support this finding. Therefore, we hold ordering the Prices to replace the high
tension wire gates with swing gates was reasonable.
The Prices contend that the district court's order that "the gate the [Prices] have placed
near the gate leading to the Beckstead Property" be removed was hased on post-trial facts and
thus, was not an issue at trial. Blaine Price acknowledges this gate was constructed just a few
days afier the trial was completed. The existence of the gate was brought to the district court's
attention in the Becksteads' written proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This
memorandum was filed June 30, 2006, after the Prices filed their proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. However, the Prices filed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of

law on July 12, 2006, as well as a written closing argument. Though the Prices address issues
surrounding gates, they did not respond to the Becksteads' allegation that they had constructed a
new gate after trial. Below, the Prices failed to raise the issue of whether the district court should
consider the post-trial allegation that they built a new gate. Therefore, they have waived the
right to raise this issue on appeal. See Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d
572,575 (1989) (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Finally, the Prices argue the district court erred in ordering that the gate placed where the
road leaves the public highway be locked at all times. The Prices assert this order is erroneous
because no party asked that those gates be locked at all times and because in the winter it is
difficult to open and close the gates and thus, preferable to leave the gate open. The district
court's order regarding this gate and that it remained locked does not indicate on which factual
findings it is based. There is no evidence in the trial transcript indicating the parties had
problems with people using the road that were not invited by either the Prices or the Becksteads.
Therefore, we vacate the portion of the order stating that this gate must remain locked at all
times.
E. Due Process

The Prices assert the easement claimed by the Becksteads is void as an unlawful taking in
violation of due process. The Prices argue that because there was a taking, they are entitled to
compensation.
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 523, n.11
(1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that "[plrivate property may be taken for public use,
but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid
therefor." Idaho Const. art. I,

5 14.

The Prices do not assert their property has been taken for public use and the evidence
would not support any such assertion. Rather, the Prices quote the Fifth Amendment and state
"Defendants contend herein that a private individual has an even gveater right to be protected by
due process from any taking without compensation." There is no support that the acquisition of
a private easement as between private parties requires the sewient estate owner be compensated,
and we do not now adopt any such rule.

The Prices do not make any argument that their due process rights were violated other
than by their failure to receive compensation for the easement. Nonetheless, we note that they
were afforded an opportunity to he heard in a timely manner. See Powers v. Canyon County, 108
Idaho 967,969,703 P.2d 1342,1344 (1985).
F. Contempt Motion

The Prices argue the district court's minute entry and order regarding the Becksteads'
second contempt motion should be reversed. In September 2006, the Becksteads made a motion
to hold the Prices in contempt. At the hearing, the parties stated they had reached a temporary
agreement and would pursue mediation. In April 2007, the Becksteads made another contempt
motion. In May 2007, the district court entered a minute entry and order stating that it heard
testimony on the second motion and that for the time being certain locks were to be removed and
that there were to be no rocks or anything else blocking the roadway. The district court then
stated that it would go up to the property, view the road, decide whether any gates or fences were
to be removed, and render a written decision. It is the May 2007 order mandating that certain
locks were to be temporarily removed that the Prices seek to have reversed.
However, in June 2007, the district court entered a subsequent order denying the second
motion for contempt. It held that the Becksteads failed to comply with the requirement that their
motion for non-summary contempt be supported with an affidavit specifying facts alleging the
violations of the court's orders. There is nothing to indicate the May 2007 minute entry and
order is still in effect after the district court entered its order ultimately denying the motion. The
final order on the Becksteads' April 2007 contempt motion dismissed the motion and, thus, was
decided in favor of the Prices. Here, the ultimate order is not adverse to the Prices and,
therefore, is not reviewable. See D e Los Santos v. J.R. Simplot Co.,Inc., 126 Idaho 963, 969,
895 P.2d 564, 570 (1995) (stating this Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless
the record discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error).
Additionally, whether the district court erroneously entered the minute entry and order is moot.

See Webb, 143 Idaho at 524, 148 P.3d at 1270 (noting an issue is moot when a favorable judicial
decision would not result in any relief).
Therefore, we decline to consider whether the May 2007 minute entry and order should
be reversed.
G. Attorney Fees on Appeal

Both the Prices and the Becksteads request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant
to I.C. $ 12-121. That statute allows an award of "reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party

. . . ."

I.C. $ 12-121.

Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party if "the Court

determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619, 624 (1999). An award of
attorney fees under this statute is appropriate if the appeal simply invites this Court "to secondguess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Hogg v. Wolske,142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d
1087, 1097 (2006).
Many of the Prices' arguments are without basis and merely invite this Court to secondguess the trial court on conflicting evidence. However, since we remand the case based on the
district court's failure to state the dimensions of the easement, the Prices' appeal was not entirely
frivolous. Therefore, we decline to award either party attorney fees on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's decision that the Becksteads acquired a prescriptive
easement and that the scope of that easement is for the purposes of ingress and egress, recreation,
grazing cattle, and making improvements to the Beckstead Property. However, we remand the
case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining the dimensions of the easement.
Additionally, we hold the Prices were not entitled to contribution for their maintenance of the
easement. We affirm the district court's order regarding the Prices' removal and replacement of
various gates, but we vacate the portion of the order stating the gate to be placed near the
highway always remain locked. We further hold the Prices were not denied due process and
decline to address the issue regarding the district court's minute entry. Finally, we decline to
award either party attorney fees on appeal. Costs to Respondents.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices W. JONES, HORTON and KIDWELL, J., pro tem,
CONCUR.
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SUMMARY
Landowners brought a quiet title action against their
neighbors, asserting an easement by necessity over
defendants' property. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of defendants, ruliug that an easement of
necessity could not arise, since the common owner of
the two properties when they were originally
conveyed was the federal government. (Superior
Court of Calaveras County, No. CV23054, John E.
Martin, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and
remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a
new judgment that plaintiffs had an easement by
necessity across defendants' property. The court held
that plaintiffs established the requisite conditions for
an easement by necessity across defendants' property,
since they established that there was a strict necessity
for the right-of-way, and that the dominant and
servient tenements were under the same ownership at
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the
necessity. Plaintiffs established that the federal
government originally conveyed both parcels of land,
and the court held that a way of necessity may arise
from lands that were originally owned and conveyed
by the federal government. Plaintiffs also established
a strict necessity for the right-of-way, since the
evidence showed their property was landlocked at the
time of the original conveyance, and that the
necessity continued to exist at the time of trial.
(Opinion by Kolkey, J., with Sims, Acting P. I., and
Raye, J., concurring.)

HEADNOTES
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports
(
I
Real
)Property 5 2--Definitions--Patent:Words,
Phrases, and Maxims-- Patent.
A patent is a grant made by a government that
confers on an individual fee simple title to public
lands, the official document of such a grant, or the
land so granted.

Appellate Review 5 145--Scope of Review-Questions of Law and Fact.
Questions of fact concern the establishment of
historical or physical facts; their resolution is
reviewed under the substantial evidence test.
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their
resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed
questions of law and fact on appeal concern the
application of a rule to facts and the consequent
determination whether the rule is satisfied. If the
pertinent inquiry into a mixed question of fact and
law requires application of experience with human
affairs, the question is predominantly factual, and its
determination is reviewed under the substantial
evidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a
critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal
principles and their underlying values, the question is
predominantly legal, and its determination is
reviewed independently.
[See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal,
Z
(J

9 319.1
3
(J Easements and Licenses in Real Property

9 6-Easements--Creation--Ways of Necessity.
An easement by way of necessity arises by operation
of law wl~enit is established that (1) there is a strict
necessity for the right-of-way, as when a claimant's
property is landlocked, and (2) the dominant and
servient tenements were under the same ownership at
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the
necessity. A way of necessity is of common law
origin, and is supported by the rule of sound public
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for
occupancy or successful cultivation. A way of
necessity is the result of the application of the
presumption that, whenever a party conveys property,
he or she conveys whatever is necessary for the
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beneficial use of that property, and retains whatever
is necessary for the beneficial use of land he or she
still possesses. The legal basis of a way of necessity
is the presumption of a grant arising from the
circumstances of the case; this presumption of a
grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed
and the facts in each particular case. The law never
imposes an easement by necessity contrary to the
express intent of the parties, since it is based on an
inferred intent arising from the strict necessity of
access for the conveyed property. A way of necessity,
having been created by the necessity for its use,
cannot be extinguished so long as the necessity
exists. An easement by necessity may persist even
though the original grantor and grantee no longer
own the properties in question.

a,
2,
&) Easements and Licenses in Real Property
$ 6--Easements-- Creation--Ways of Necessity-.
Federal Govenunent as Common Original Grantor.
In a quiet title action by landowners against their
neighbors, the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs'
alleged easement of necessity could not arise on the
ground that the common owner of the two properties
when they were originally conveyed was the federal
government. Plaintiffs established the requisite
conditions for an easernent by necessity across
defendants' property, since they established that there
was a strict necessity for the right-of-way, and that
the dominant and servient tenements were under the
same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving
rise to the necessity. A way of necessity may arise
from lands that were originally owned and conveyed
by the federal government; the public policy
underlying easements by necessity is not served by
the creation of a categorical exception for the federal
government as common grantor. Plaintiffs also
established a strict necessity for the right-of-way,
since the evidence showed their property was
landlocked at the time of the original conveyance,
and that the necessity continued to exist at the time of
trial.
[See Annot., What Constitutes Unitv of Title or
Ownershiu Sufficient for Creation of an Easement by
Implication or Way of Necessitv (1979) 94 A.L.R.3d
West's Key Number Digest, Easements
&18(1).]
(5a, &) Easements and Licenses in Real Property 5
6--Easements-- Creation--Ways of Necessity--Right
Passing to Remote Grantee--Continuing Necessity-Burden of Proof.

a

In the absence of unusual circumstances, the failure
or delay of a grantee to assert or exercise a right-ofway by necessity over the grantor's adjoining
premises does not preclude either the original or a
remote grantee from subsequently asserting such
right. Because an easement by way of necessity is
imputed on the basis of the presumption that a party
conveys whatever is necessary for the property's
beneficial use, and is founded on the policy against
pennitting land to remain in perpetual idleness, the
right to a way of necessity may lie dormant through
several transfers of title, and yet pass with each
transfer as appurtenant to the dominant estate, and be
exercised at any time by the holder of the title.
Although a strict necessity at the time of conveyance
can create an easement by way of necessity, it does
not preserve it for all time. The party proposing that
strict necessity for easement no longer exists bears
the burden of proof on that issue.
COUNSEL
Law Offices of Kenneth M. Foley and Kenneth M.
Foley for Plaintiffs and Appellants. *799
Law Offices of David S. Thomas and David S.
Thomas for Defendants and Respondents.

KOLKEY, J.
Plaintiffs Theodore and Sylvia Kellogg (the
Kelloggs) were gifted a landlocked parcel, which
requires that they use a private road that crosses their
neighbors' properties in order to gain access to the
property. Defendants Ronald and Judith Garcia (the
Garcias) deny that the Kelloggs have a right to use
the private road that traverses their property for
purposes of such access. The Kelloggs sued to quiet
title, claiming an implied or express easement over
the Garcias' and their other neighbors' properties.
Following trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the
Garcias.
Under the law, "[aJn easement by way of necessity
arises ... when it is established that (1) there is a strict
necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant's
property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and
servient tenements were under the same ownership at
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the
necessity." (Moores v. Walsh (1995) 38 Cal.Apu.4th
1046,1049145 Cal.Rptr.2d 3891(Mooves).)
Relying on Bullv Hill Cuuuer Mining &Sineltine Co.
v. Bruson (1906) 4 c a 1 . A ~ ~180187
.
P. 2371(Bully

02008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

102 Cal.App.4th 796
Page 3
102 Cal.App.4th 796, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 817,02 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 10,146, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,551

Hill), the trial court ruled in this case that an
easement by way of necessity cannot arise where the
only common owner of the two subsequently
colrveyed properties was the federal government.

We disagree and shall reverse. Current case law holds
that the federal government may be the common
owner of the properties whose conveyance gives rise
to the strict necessity that justifies an easement by
way of necessity. (See Moore.9. suura. 38
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, fn. I.) Colmnentators and
courts alike have opined that this conclusion is
consistent with the public policy that underlies the
establishment of an easement by necessity, which is
to promote the productive use of land. Such a policy
makes no distinction between landlocked parcels
originally owned by a public, rather than a private,
party. Accordingly, we conclude that the Kelloggs
have established the requisite conditions for an
easement by necessity across the Garcias' property so
that they can reach their parcel.
Factual and Procedural Background
I. The Facts

FNl A patent is defined as: "2.a. A grant
made by a government that confers on an
individual fee-simple title to public lands. b.
The official document of such a grant. c.
The land so granted." (American Heritage
Dict. (3d ed. 1992) p. 1326.)
FN2 The Garcias' brief states: "The CHINO
QUARTZ MINE was originally granted to
F. NOVELLA by the UNITED STATES
government by patent in 1878. At that time,
all of the surrounding land, including the
land owned at trial by all of the parties[,]
was owned by the UNITED STATES
government."
In 1944, plaintiff Sylvia Kellogg's parents purchased
the Chino Quartz Mine. By 1945, the Kellogg family
was using the north road to travel between the Chino
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road.
In 1957, the federal government transferred the Wild
Rose Mine by patent to Sylvia Kellogg's parents. The
Wild Rose Mine surrounded the Chino Quartz Mine.

At the time of trial, the Kelloggs were owners of a
property in Calaveras County, known as the Chino
Quartz Mine. A road ran north (the north road) *SO0
from the Chino Quartz Mine across another property
owned by the Kelloggs (know~las the Wild Rose
Mine), and then over several properties owned by
other private parties-the Rollinses, the Walshes, the
Stones, and the Garcias-before it reached Jurs Road,
a county road. The Garcias own the property adjacent
to Jurs Road.

In 1987, as a result of a gift from Sylvia Kellogg's
father, the Kelloggs (with their son, Craig Kellogg)
became the owners of the Chino Quartz Mine. And in
1991, the KelIoggs and their son beca111c the owuc~s
of the Wild Rose Mine in the same manner. The total
property is 42 acres, with the Chino Quartz Mine
accounting for 10 acres and the Wild Rose Mine for
32 acres.

(L) (See fn.

The Kelloggs brought a quiet title action, claming a
right-of-way easement over the north road from the
Chino Quartz Mine to Jurs Road. They *SO1 sued all
the property owners of the land traversed by that
road, except the Rollinses, who had granted the
Kelloggs an easement. ';N3

1.) The evidence at trial showed that in
1878, the United States conveyed the Chino Quartz
Mine by patent to F. Novella. m' The property
surrounding the Chino Quartz Mine, including the
property currently owned by the Garcias, was federal
land-a point that the Garcias concede in their brief.
FN2
Any roads that would have existed in the areaincluding any road across what is now the property of
the Walshes, the Stones, and the Garcias-would have
been on land owned by the federal government. No
evidence, however, suggested that the north road
existed in 1878 or indicated how access was obtained
in 1878 from the Chino Quartz Mine to any public
road.

11. The Lawsuit

FN3 The Kelloggs subsequently filed two
amended complaints also naming, as
additional defendants, property owners lying
to the south of their property, as another
road runs south from the Chino Quartz Mine
to Fay Street, which road crosses property
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owned by the Moores. The trial court found
that there was insufficient evidence to
impose an easement over the Moores'
property under any legal theory. That ruling
has not been challenged in this appeal.

ROSE MINE to [Sylvia Kellogg's father], but there
was no common ownership of the parcel conveyed to
[her father] and the parcels owned by defendants
WALSH, STONE[,] and GARCIA at the time of that
conveyance." *SO2

At trial, the Kelloggs advanced several theories to
support the existence of the easement, including an
easement by way of necessity. After a bench trial, the
court ruled in favor of the Garcias on all theories,
rejecting, among other things, the Kelloggs' claim of
an easement by way of necessity.

The court then made its legal conclusions concerning
the Kelloggs' failure to establish an easement by way
of necessity:

Because we shall reverse that part of the court's
ruling addressing the Kelloggs' right to an easement
by way of necessity, we shall only recite the court's
findings on that issue. The court made the following
factual findings relevant to that theory:
"(1) No evidence was presented as to whether the
United States of America [I was the common owner
of all of the land between the CHINO QUARTZ
MINE parcel and the land where JURS ROAD is
now located at the time said mine was granted to F.
NOVELLA.
"(2) No evidence was presented as to whether either
JURS Road or the north road across the land now
owned by defendants WALSH, STONE[,] and
GARCIA existed at the time the CHINO QUARTZ
MINE was granted to F. NOVELLA.

"(3) No evidence was presented as to where any
access to the C H N O QUARTZ MINE was located
prior to 1944.

"(2) An easement by necessity can exist when a
landowner sells one of two or more parcels and the
parcel sold is completely landlocked by the
remaining property of the grantor, or partly by the
land of the grantor and partly by the land of others. In
that case, the law will create an easement across the
remaining land of the grantor in order to benefit and
provide access to the property conveyed. [Citation.]
"(3) Original ownership by the United States does not
constitute the necessary unity of ownership to support
an easement by implication or necessity (Bullv Hill
supra, 4 Cal.Aoo. at P. 1831, and 94 [A.L.R.3d] 502,
i17-518)." 'N'

FN4 The full annotation cited by the court
is: Atmotation, What Constitutes Unitv of
Title or Ownershio Sufficient for Creation of
an Easement by lmolication or Way of
Necessitv (1979) 94 A.L.R.3d 502.517-518.
$ 9[c]. The annotation cites Bullv Hill,
supra. 4 Cal.App. 180.
The court also rejected the Kelloggs' alternative
theories for an easement.

"(4) Evidence was presented to show that the CHINO
QUARTZ mine was in active production after the
grant from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and prior to 1944.

The Kelloggs filed a timely appeal from the judgment
entered in favor of the Garcias.

"(5) Apart from the original public ownership by the
UNITED STATES, no evidence was presented to
show that there was any common ownership of the
parcels of real property owned by the plaintiffs and
the parcels of real property owned by defendants
WALSH, STONE[,] and GARCIA.

I. Standard ofReview

"(6) Evidence was presented as to the existence of the
north road at the time of the grant of the WILD

Discussion

@) The trial court's decision that the Kelloggs did not
have an easement by way of necessity presents a
mixed question of fact and law for purposes of our
review. This requires that we review the court's
factual findings under the substantial-evidence test
and the court's legal reasoning de novo:
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"Questions of fact concern the establishment of
historical or physical facts; their resolution is
reviewed under the substantial-evidence test.
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their
resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed
questions of law and fact concern the application of
the rule to the facts and the consequent determination
whether the rule is satisfied. If the pertinent inquiry
requires application of experience with human
affairs, the question is predominantly factual and its
determination is reviewed under the substantialevidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a
critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal
principles and their underlying values, the question is
predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed
independently." (*803Crocker National Bank v. San
Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881. 8881264 Cal.Rptr.
139, 782 P.2d 278](Crocker); accord, In re Marriaee
ofLehman (1998) 18 Caldtl~169. 184174 Cal.Rutr.2d
825.955 P.2d 4511.1
The trial court's detennination that an easement by
necessity did not exist because "[o]riginal ownership
by the United States does not constitute the necessary
unity of ownership to support an easement by ...
necessity" presents a Legal question. We review it
independently. The pertinent inquiry requires critical
consideration of legal principles and their underlying
values. (Crocker, s i ~ r a49
. ~ a l . 3 dat u. 888: see~also
Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799801135 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 9601.1
On the other hand, the trial court's finding that there
was no evidence that the federal government was the
common owner of all the property between the Chino
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road in 1878 is a factual
question, which we review to dctermine if it is
supported by substantial evidence. (Crocker. suura,
49 Cal.3d at P. 888; 9 Witkiu, Cal. Procedure (2002
supp.) Appeal, 9 319, p. 87; see also Western States
Petroleum Assn. v. S u ~ e r i o rCourt (1995) 9 Cal.4th
559,571138 Cal.Rutr.2d 139.888 P.2d 12681.)
11. Elements of an Easement by Way ofNecessily

(3)The circumstances For the creation of an easement
by necessity in California are well known: "An
easement by way of necessity arises by operation of
law when it is established that (I) there is a strict
necessity for the right-of-way, as when the claimant's
property is landlocked and (2) the dominant and

servient tenements were under the same ownership at
the time of the conveyance giving rise to the
necessity." (Moores, supra. 38 Cal.App.4th at u.
1049: accord, Roemer v. Pauaas (1988) 203
Cal.Apu.3d
201,
205-2061249
Cal.Rptr.
~ ( R o e m e r ) ; D a v w a l t v. Walker (1963) 217
Cal.Auu.2d
669.
672131
Cal.Rntr.
w(Daywalt);Reese v. Borehi (1963) 216
Cal.Auu.2d 324.332-333130 Cal.Rutr. 8681(Reese).)
A way of necessity 'is of common-law origin arid is
supported by the rule of sound public policy that
lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or
successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the
application of the presumption that whenever a party
conveys property, he conveys whatever is necessary
for the bel~eficial use of that property and retains
whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of land
he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of
necessity is the presumption of a grant arisingfvom
the circumstances of the case. This presumption of a
grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed
and the facts in each particular case.' "
("804Daywalt. suura, 217 Cal.App.2d at PU. 672italics added by Daywalt, citing 17A Am.Jur.
(1957) Easements, 9 58, pp. 668-669.)
"

a

Hence, the law 'never imposes ... an easement by
necessity contrary to the express intent of the parties'
" since it is based on an inferred intent arising from
the strict necessity of access for the conveyed
property. (Daywalt, suura, 217 Cal.App.2d at P. 673.)
"

In addition, "[a way of necessity], having been
created by the necessity for its use, cannot be
extinguished so long as the necessity exists." (Blum
v. Weston (1894) 102 Gal. 362, 369136 P. 7781.) An
easement by necessity !nay persist even though the
original grantor and grantee no longer own the
properties in question: An "easement of necessity
may be asserted by remote grantees in the chain of
title long after the easement was created by the
original common grantor, despite the failure of a
prior grantee to exercise the right; and the 5-yeat
statute of limitations on quiet title actions [Code Civ.
Proc., 61 318) does not apply." (4 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Real Property, 5 459, p.
637, citing Lichtv v. Sicke2.s (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d
696,700-7011197 Cal.Rutr. 137](Lichty).)
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However, " 'a right of way of necessity ceases when
the owner of the way acquires a new means of access
to his estate, as where he acquires other property of
his own over which he may pass, or where a public
way is laid out which affords access to his premises;
and the fact that a former way of necessity continues
to he the most convenient way will not prevent its
extinguishment when it ceases to be absolutely
necessary.' " (Daywalt, supra. 217 Cal.Aop.2d at PP.
576-677:accord, Moores. supra. 38 Cal.Auu.4th at o.
U B u t the burden of proof that an easement by
way of necessity has ceased is on the party opposing
the easement "to show by acceptable evidence that a
new right of way was in fact made available to the
plaintiff." (Daywalt, suura. 217 Cal.Auo.2d at 0.

677.)
(&) We now turn to whether the two elements of an
easement by way of necessity-(I) a strict necessity
for the right-of-way, and (2) common ownership of
the servient and dominant tenements at the time of
the conveyance giving rise to the necessity-were
satisfied here.

111. The Element of Common Ownership
As noted, one of the elements of an easement by way
of necessity is that the dominant and servient
tenements were under the same ownership at the time
of the conveyance that gave rise to the necessity.
(Moores. suora, 38 Cal.Aou.4th at P. 1049.1*805
In this case, the trial court found that the common
ownership condition was not satisfied, because the
original owner of the properties in question was the
federal government. Relying on Bullv Hill, supra. 4
Cal.Auo. at page 183. the trial court ruled that
"[olriginal ownership by the United States does not
constitute the necessary unity of ownership to support
an easement by ... necessity."
In Bully Hill, the defendants claimed an easement by
necessity for a three-mile wagon road that crossed the
plaintiffs land. Although that road was the only
manner by which the defendants could reach, by team
or wagon, their hotel from any public road
Hill, suura. 4 Cal.Anp. at P. 1822 the Court of
Appeal stated that "this is far Gom saying that
another road to the mines and buildings cannot be
constructed over said defendant[sIt lands." (Id. at p.
183,)Because the defendants did not show "the vital

fact that there [was] no other way to reach the lands
or property of defendants" (ibid.), the appellate court
in Bully Hill refused to sustain the defendants' claim
of an easement by necessity. It concluded: "[Tlhe
facts essential to the existence of a way of necessity
were not establisl~edby the evidence or found by the
court. 'The right of way from necessity must be in
fact what the tern naturally imports and cannot exist
except in cases of strict necessity. It will not exist
when a man can get to his property over his own
land. That the way over his own land is too steep or
too narrow or that other and like difficulties exist,
does not alter the case, and it is only when there is no
way through his own land that a grantee can claim a
right over that of his grantor. It must also appear that
the grantee has no other way.' [Citation.]" (Ibid)
However, the court in Bully Hill also noted that
"[t]here is nothing in this record to show that the
relation of grantor and grantee ever existed between
the plaintiff and any of the defendants. The mere fact
that all of the land was originally part of the public
domain and hence owned by a common grantor,
cannot confer the peculiar right out of which a way of
necessity arises. If, however, it be fully conceded that
all other basic facts essential to a way from necessity
existed, the vital fact that there is no other way to
reach the lands or property of defendants is lacking."
(Bullv Hill, supra, 4 Cal.Auu. at P. 183J
ln this case, the trial court and the Garcias rely on the
Bullv Hill court's statement that "ltlhe mere fact that
all bf the land was originally part of the public
domain and hence owned by a common grantor,
cannot confer the peculiar right out of which a way of
necessity arises" (Bullv Hill, supra. 4 Cal.Apu. at 0.
to bar an easement by way of necessity here.
m,

=avo
...A

But Bully Hill did not cite any authority for that
proposition. Nor did it rely on that statement to reject
defendants' claim of an easement by necessity.
Instead, it focused on defendants' failure to establish
strict necessity, namely, that there was no other way
to reach defendants' hotel.
Moreover, Bully Hill is in conflict with the current
trend in the law and recent California case law.
In Moores, suura. 38 Cal.App.4th 1046, the
California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate
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District reached the opposite conclusion from that
suggested in Bully Hill (although it did not discuss
that case specifically). Mr. and Mrs. Moores (the
Mooreses) claimed an easement by necessity to cross
property owned by William Walsh, which easement
was necessary to reach Highway 1 from their
property. (Id. at p. 1048,)Evidence was presented that
the federal government had once owned both
properties.(Ibid.) The parcel now owned by the
Mooreses had been previously conveyed by the
federal government to the State of California as a
"school lands" grant in 1873, which had left it
landlocked on all sides by federal land. (Ibid.) The
state had subsequently transferred the land to the
Regents of the University of California, who had sold
it to the Mooreses. (Ibid.) The Walsh property
consisted of parcels which the federal government
had transferred to private owners. (Ibid.) After a
court trial, judgment was entered for Walsh.(Ibid.)
In analyzing the Mooreses' claim that an easement by
necessity existed, the appellate court ruled that an
easement by way of necessity may arise from lands
owned by the federal government. But it concluded
that "because the State of California and later [t]he
Regents had the power of eminent domain there was
no strict necessity for an easement over the lX&h
parcel." (Moores, suura. 38 C a l . A ~ ~ . 4 t hat D.
1050.)In coming to the conclusion that the power of
eminent domain allowed the state to create its own
access, it addressed Walsh's contention that "common
ownership must be by other than the federal
government in order to satisfy the [other] prong of
the easement by necessity test" (id. at p. 1049, fn. I),
which would have avoided the need to reach the issue
of necessity. The court ruled: "More recent cases ...
make it clear that this is not the case. [Citation.] An
easement by necessity may exist across lands owned
by the federal government. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Moores court cited
two federal cases that found that an easement by
necessity could arise where the federal government
conveyed a property landlocked by other federal
land: State o f Utah v. Andrus (D. Utah 1979) 486
F.SUDD.995. 1002, and Kinscherff v. United States
(10th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 159. 161."807
Moreover, numerous other cases share that view.
(See Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land (2001) Creation of Easements by

Implication, ch. 4, ij 4:7, pp. 4-19 to 4-20, fn. 25
(hereinafter Bruce & Ely), collecting cases.)
Commentators have likewise concluded that the
federal government should be treated the same as a
private common owner: "Such an approach is
consistent with both theories underlying the
easement-of-necessity concept. It Eurthers the public
policy of promoting productive use of land and also
is in harmony with the presumption that the parties
intended to grant or to reserve an easement to benefit
the landlocked parcel." (See Bruce & Ely, supra, ij
4:7, pp. 4-19 to 4-20; 4 Powell on Real Property
(2001) Easements and Licenses, $ 34.07 141, pp. 3459 to 34-60 [cases permitting easements by necessity
over fedeml land represent the "wiser holding"
because the "public policy favoring land utilization
applies to cases where ownership was in the state as
well as where the original unity was in a private
person"]; Tiffany, The Law of Real Property (3d ed.
1939) 9: 793, p. 290 [it is not clear "why a
conveyance by the government should be subject to a
different rule ... from a conveyance by a private
individual" when, inter alia, "the same considerations
of public policy in favor of utilization of the land
apply in both cases"].)
We agree. Since an easement by way of necessity is
based on the presumption that a conveyance seeks to
transfer 'whatever is necessary for the beneficial use
of that property'
d - "(
at D. 673). there is absolutely no reason to impute a
different intention to the federal govemment when
conveying western lands (failing an expression of
intent to the contrary). After all, particularly in the
19th century-when the West was being settled-the
federal government had no reason to render the land
it conveyed unfit for occupancy or cultivation. Quite
the opposite. "During most of the 19th century, our
public land policy was basically one of disposal [of
lands owned by the United States] into non-Federal
ownership to encourage settlement and development
of the country. Those lands most favorably situated
for mineral development, agriculture, and townsites
were settled first." (U.S. Public Land Law Review
Com., One Third of the Nation's Land, A Report to
the President and to the Congress (1970) p. 28; see
also Yale, Legal Titles to Mining Claims and Water
Rights, in California, Under the Mining Law of
Congress, of July, 1866 (1867) pp. iv-v, 10-13.)
Indeed, California case law recognizes that the
"
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doctrine of easements by necessity "is founded upon
the salutary policy against permitting land to remain
in perpetual idleness." (Roemer. supra. 203
Cal.Aop.3d at p. 207. original italics; Lichty, supra.
149 Cal.Aoo.3d at P. 703:Reese. Supra, 216
Cal.App.2d at o. 331:Dawalt, supra. 217
Cal.Awp.2d at D. 672.)Accordingly, looking at both
the rationale underlying the doctrine of easement
*SO8 by necessity and the general purposes of federal
conveyances in the 19th century, no reason exists
why the conveyance by the federal government in
this case should not be given the same presumption
afforded other parties, namely, that a conveyance
includes whatever is necessary for the beneficial use
of the land. (See Davwalt, suora. 217 Cal.Aop.2d at
ep. 672-673J
Indeed, the trial court in this case found that "the
CHINO QUARTZ mine was in active production
after the grant from the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA and prior to 1944." It would make no
sense that the federal government would convey title
to an active mine to a private party without illtending
to give the new owner access to the property.
Thus, we agree with the commentators and the Court
of Appeal in Moores that common ownership by the
federal govemment satisfies the requirement of
common ownership under the doctrine of easements
by necessity. Neither the public policy nor rationale
underlying easements by necessity is served by the
creation of a categorical exception for the federal
government.
FN.5 The opposing concern is that an
easement by necessity over former federal
land "would permit every remote grantee of
a portion of the public domain to have an
easement by way of necessity over
surrounding lands. This argument overlooks
the special terminability aspect of easements
by necessity upon a change of
circumstances. The changed circumstances
effectively eliminate the necessity." (4
Powell on Real Property, supra, Easements
and Licenses, 5 34.07[4], p. 34-60, fns.
omitted.)
IV. Application ofthe Common Ownership
Requirement

This does not quite end our consideration of the
matter, however. We must now determine whether
the federal govemment owned all the surrounding
land at the time that the Chino Quartz Mine was
conveyed such that it gave rise to a strict necessity
for a right-of-way. As mentioned, the trial court
found that "[nlo evidence was presented as to
whether the United States of America[] was the
common owner of all of the land between the CHINO
QUARTZ MINE parcel and the land where JURS
ROAD is now located at the time said mine was
granted to F. NOVELLA."
The parties agree, however, that this finding is not
supported by substantial evidence and that the federal
government was the common owner of all the land in
1878. Indeed, the trial court's finding is seemingly
inconsistent with its other finding that "[alpart from
the original public ownership by the UNITED
STATES, uo evidence was presented to show that
there was any common ownership of the parcels of
real property owned by the plaintiffs and the parcels
of real property owned by defendants WALSH,
STONE[,] and GARCIA." (Italics added.) And the
Garcias concede in their brief that "[tlhe CHINO
QUARTZ MINE was originally granted to F.
NOVELLA by *SO9 the UNITED STATES
government by patent in 1878. At that time, all of the
surrounding land, including the land owned at trial by
all of the parties[,] was owned by the UNITED
STATES govemment."
And there was substantial evidence that the Eederal
govemment owned all the land between the Chino
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road in 1878. Frank Harrison,
a title investigator who had researched the chain of
title of the Kellogg, Walsh, Stone, and Garcia
properties, testified that in I878 "the property now
owned by Garcia, now owned by Stone, now owned
by Walsh, was still all owned by the United States
Government." Harrison further agreed that at the
time, any roads that existed in the area, "for instance,
from Jurs Road ... currently going through the Garcia
property, through the Stone propeny, through the
Walsh property, would have been on Uuited States
Government land." Harrison also testified that prior
to the 1957 patent, the Wild Rose Mine "was held in
the name of the United States Government," and this
property surrounded the Chino Quartz Mine.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
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parties' concession that the land between the Chino
Quartz Mine and Jurs Road was owned by the federal
government at the time of the 1878 patent. The
court's contrary finding is simply not supported by
substantial evidence.
Hence, we conclude that the corn erred in its finding
that the United States was not the common owner of
ail the relevant parcels in 1878 and in its ruling that
the Kelloggs could not make out a claim of a11
easement by necessity based on the federal
government's original common ownership of the
Kelloggs' and the Garcias' land.
V. Strict Necessity
Nonetheless, to establish an easement by necessity,
the Kelloggs also had to show that a strict necessity
for access existed at the time of the conveyance, i.e.,
that the property was landlocked. (Davtvalt, suuya,
217 C a l . A ~ ~ . 2 dat u. 672;Lichtv. supra. 149
Cal.A~u.3dat u. 699:Roemer. supra. 203 Cal.Au~.3d
at u. 206;Moores. supra. 38 Cal.A~~.4that D.
W T h e court made no finding on that point.
However, we have already identified evidence in the
record showing that the Chino Quartz Mine was
landlocked by federal land after it was conveyed in
1878, and the Garcias do not contend otherwise,
conceding that all of the surrounding land was owned
by the federal government at the time of the 1878
patent. There was a strict necessity for a right-ofway.
At oral argument, however, the Garcias argued that
the absence of any evidence that the north road
existed or joined Jurs Road in 1878 precludes an
easement by necessity. We reject this argument.
*810
@) '[A] way of necessity does not rest on a preexisting use but on the need for a way across the
granted or reserved premises.' " (Reese, supra. 216
Cal.Auu.2d at D. 331.1 '[Alt least in the absence of
unusual circumstances, the failure or delay of a
grantee to assert or exercise a right of way by
necessity over his grantor's adjoining premises, where
he cannot reach a highway Crom his property except
over lands privately owned, does not preclude him,
or a remote grantee, fvom subsequently asserting
such right. The questiol~has arisen most frequently
"

"

where the original grantee failed to assert his right of
way by necessity, and thereafter a remote grantee
sought to exercise it.' " (Lichty, suora, 149
Cal.Auu.3d at D. 700, italics added by Lichty, quoting
h o t . (1941) 133 A.L.R. 1393.)Because an
easement by way of necessity is imputed on the basis
of the presumption that a party conveys whatever is
necessary for the property's beneficial use (Dawalt,
suora. 217 Cal.Auu.2d at DD. 672-6731 and is
founded on the policy against permitting land "to
remain in perpetual idleness" (Lichty, at p. 703), "the
right to a way of necessity may lie dormant through
several transfirs of title and yet pass with each
transfer as appurtenant to the dominant estate and be
exercised at any time by the holder of the title.
[Citation.]' " (Id, at p. 701, italics added by Lichty.)
Still, although a strict necessity at the time of
conveyance can create an easement by way of
necessity, it does not preserve it for all time. As noted
earlier, an easement by necessity will exist only so
long as the necessity exists. (Lichtv. supra. 149
Cal.Auu.3d at D. 699;Davwalt. suora. 217
CaI.Auu.2d at DD. 676-677;Moores. supra. 38
Cal.Auu.4th at u. 1051.1

a)

The evidence in the record here indicates that the
Kelloggs bad no access to a public road solely over
their own land or over another's land through an
alternative easement. They remained landlocked at
the time of trial.
Admittedly, a map in the record appears to show that
the Kelloggs' Wild Rose Mine property on its
southern boundary came near Fay Street, located in
the Lynn Park Acres subdivision. At trial, Dennis
Wiebe, a land surveyor, initially testified that his
examination of a subdivision map showed that the
Kelloggs' property touched Fay Street and that a
driveway could be constructed to the street. But
Wiebe then testified that a county assessor's map
showed a parcel between the Kelloggs' land and Fay
Street. And he testified that Fay Street was located in
Lynn Park Acres, a private subdivision, and that the
Kelloggs would have to obtain an easement for a
right of way across the subdivision's streets from the
owners of the property along those streets, perhaps as
many as 50 of them. Further, Wiebe testified that
when he did a "811 boundary survey for one of the
property owners between the Kelloggs' property and
Fay Street, he determined that "the existing road did
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not go into the Kellogg property."
In sum, it was not established that the necessity for an
easement no longer existed because of the availability
of another route affording access from Fay Street to
the property. To the contraty, the trial court held that
there was insufficient evidence that the Kelloggs had
an easement to Fay Street across the property of the
Moores-a ruling not challenged on appeal.

a)The party

proposing that strict necessity no
longer exists bears the burden of proof on that issue
(Dawalt, supra. 217 Cal.Awp.2d at P. 677)-a burden
which none of the defendants carried. We also note
that none of the defendants argued in their posttrial
briefs that the necessity had ceased to exist, and the
Garcias do not so contend on appeal.

Kelloggs have an easement by necessity
over the Garcias' property for access to Jurs
Road, we decline to address their alternative
theories in support of the same easement. If
that necessity were ever to cease, it would
only be because the Kelloggs have obtained
an alternative route to their property.
Sims, Acting P. J., and Raye, J., concurred. "813
Cal.App.3.Dist.
Kellogg v. Garcia
102 Cal.App.4th 796, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 817, 02 Cal.
Daily Op. Sew. 10,146, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R.
11,551
END OF DOCUMENT

(a)

Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion that
can be drawn from the evidence is that a strict
necessity existed for a right-of-way: The Chino
Quartz Mine was landlocked by federal land when
conveyed by patent in 1878 and continued to be
landlocked through trial.
VI. Conclusion

Since the Kelloggs' property was landlocked at the
time it was conveyed to their predecessor-in-interest,
and the dominant and sewient tenements were under
the same ownership at the time of the conveyance
(that of the federal government), an easement by way
of necessity arose. And since there was no evidence
that the necessity ceased to exist, the Kelloggs are
entitled to an easement by way of necessity through
the existing roadway that crosses the Garcias'
property so that they can access their landlocked
property. Of course, if the Kelloggs' necessity ever
ceases. the Garcias can seek relief from the easement.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court with directions to enter judgment that
the Kelloggs have an easement by necessity *812
across the Garcias' urouerty. The Kelloges shall
recover their costs o d aipeai. (Cal. Rules ;?Court.
rule 26(a).) m6
FN6 In light of our decision that the
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United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.
John KINSCHERFF and Sunnyland Development
Co., Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, the State of New
Mexico, the Pueblo of Santa Ana, Mark IV
Enterprises, a New Mexico Corporation, E. M.
Riebold and H. E. Leonard, Appellees.
No. 77-1083.
Argued Aug. 8, 1978.
Decided Nov. 1, 1978
Property owners brought quiet title action seeking
declaratory relief and damages against the United
States and others, and claiming right to use road. The
United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico, H. Vearle Payne, J., dismissed cause, and
property owners appealed. The Court of Appeals held
that: (I) plaintiffs interest in public road would not
be any more than any other member of public and as
such did not constitute an "i~~terest"under statute
authorizing suits against United States in quiet title
action to real property in which governmellt claims
an interest and which requires in part that plaintiff set
forth nature of "interest" which plaintiff claims in
real property, and (2) complaint stated cause of action
as to existence of implied easement of necessity, its
extent, or whether road was such an easement.
Set aside and remanded.

"interest" in real property contemplated by statute
permitting suits against United States in quiet title
actions to real property, which statute required in part
that the plaintiff set forth the nature of the "interest"
which plaintiff claims in the real property. 28
U.S.C.A. 6 2409a.

W. Quieting Title 318 -10.2
318 Quieting Title
-

3181 Right of Action and Defenses
318k9 Title of Plaintiff
-

318k10.2 k. Sufficiency in General. Most
Cited cases
(Formerly 3 18k1O(2))
under N e w - ~ e x i c olaw, quiet title action may be
brought by anyone claiming some interest in title to
real property.

j
.
3
J Quieting Titie 318 -10.2
318 Quieting Title
3181 Right of Action and Defenses
-

3Title of Plaintiff

318k10.2 k. Sufficiency in General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 3 18k10(2))
Members of public as such do not have a "title" in
public roads, for purposes of maintaining quiet title
actions. 1953 N.M.Comp. $9 55-1-1 et seq., 55-1-5.

plJ

Quieting Title 318 -2

318 Quieting Title

West Headnotes
JJJ United States 393 'Q3"5125(22)

393 United States
393IX Actions

3181 Right of Action and Defenses
-

k. Property Subject of Action. Most
Cited Cases
Easements are real property interests subject to quiet
title actions. 28 U.S.C.A. 6 2409a.
Pubfic Lands 317 -11413)

Liability and Consent of United
States to Be Sued
393k125(22) k. Property, Actions Relating
to in General. Most Cited Cases
Interest of plaintiff in public road, if it existed, was
vested in public generally, and thus, was not an

317 Public Lands
31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
Patents
Construction and Operation in
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General
317k114(3) k. Property Included. &t
Cited Cases
While nothine ordinarilv. oasses bv. imnlication
in a
.
patent, implied easement may arise within scope of
patent,

.

-

141 Easements
-

Extent of Right, Use, and Obstruction
Actions for Establishment and
Protection of Easements
14Ik6I(8) k. Pleading. Most Cited Cases
In action to quiet title to road built by United States,
complaint stated claim as to existence of implied
easement of necessity, its extent, and whether subject
road was such an easement. 28 U.S.C.A. 6 2409a.

121 Limitation of Actions 241 e23180(7)
241 Limitation of Actions
-

Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review

241k184 Demurrer, Exception, or Motion
Raising Defense
241k180(7) k. Motion. Most Cited Cases
In action to quiet title wherein plaintiffs claimed title
by virtue of implied easement by necessity, as
successors in interest to grantee of United States by
patent, pleadings raised mixed question of law and
fact, precluding dismissal on limitations grounds, as
to whether patentee or successor in interest knew or
should have known of United States' claim of no
easement or limited easement over subject property.
28 U.S.C.A. 8 2409a.

*I59 Hartley B. Wess, Miller & Melton, Ltd.,
Albuquerque, N. M. (Robert E. Melton, Miller &
Melton, Ltd., Albuquerque, N. M., with him on the
brief), for appellants.
Carl Strass, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.
C. (James W. Moorman, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Edmund B. Clark, James '160 R. Amold, and Larry
A. Boggs, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.
C., with him on the brief), for appellees, United
States and the Pueblo of Santa Ana.
Richard L. Russell, Chief Counsel, State Highway
Dept., Santa Fe, N. M. (Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen. of
New Mexico, and Henry Rothschild, Deputy Chief
Counsel, State Highway Dept., Santa Fe, N. M., with
him on the brief), for appellee, State of New Mexico.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and
LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is a quiet title action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a,
seeking declaratory relief and damages against the
United States and others. The complaint alleges that
the United States had built a road on its land to reach
a dam site, and that it continues to control the use of
this road. The road is asserted to be the only access
plaintiffs have to their property. Plaintiffs are seeking
to develop their land, but the United States would not
let them use the road, which is adjacent to the
property, to bring in equipment, machinery, or
material.
Plaintiffs seek to establish a right to use the road for
all purposes as members of the public, and also as a
way of necessity. The land of plaintiffs was patented
to their predecessors in interest.
The trial court dismissed as to the defendant, State of
New Mexico, as to the Pueblo of Santa Ana, and as to
several individuals who were residents of New
Mexico. Subsequently the court also dismissed the
cause as to the United States for failure to state a
cause of action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a, and this
appeal was taken.

LLI On this appeal the plaintiffs argue that this is
properly an action to quiet title. The statute, 28
U.S.C. s 2409a, in permitting suits against the United
States in quiet title actions to real property in which
the Government claims an interest, requires in part
that the plaintiff" . . . set forth with particularity the
nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff
claims in the real property, the circumstances under
which it was required, and the right, title, or interest
claimed by the United States."28 U.S.C. s 2409a(c),
Thus plaintiffs assert that they have a real property
interest in the Jemez Dam Road as members of the
public entitled to use public roads pursuant to
N.M.S.A. s 55-1-1 Et seq. (1953 Comnp.), and as an
owner of land abutting a public highway, and under
43 U.S.C. s 932. This "interest" in plaintiffs, we must
hold, is not an interest in real property contemplated
by 28 U.S.C. s 2409a. If it exists, it is vested in the
public generally. The legislative history of &
refers to the historical development of Quia
timet suits in the courts of equity in England, and to
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quiet title suits as developed in this counuy.
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1972, Vol. 3, p.
4547. It thus must be assumed that Congress intended
to permit to be brought against the United States the
typical quiet title suit, as it has developed in the
various states in this country through statutory and
case law.

easements to be included in the real property rights
adjudicated in a quiet title action. The House Report
states: "The quieting of title where the plaintiff
claims an estate less than a fee simple an easement or
the title to minerals is likewise included in the terms
of the proposed statute."H.R.Rep.No. 92-1559, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in (1972) U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 4552.

121 The plaintiffs, on this point,

do not assert that
their interest is an easement or any similar right;
instead, as mentioned above, the right is claimed by
them as members of the public. The substantive law
in New Mexico for quiet title actions recites the
notion that the public has a real property interest in
public roads. A quiet title action may be brought by
anyone claiming an interest in t l ~ e real
property.Marquez v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.. 12
N.M. 445, 78 P. 40. The interest, however, must be
some interest in the title to the property.Rock Island
Oil & ref in in^ Co. v. Simmons, 73 N.M. 142. 386
P.2d 239. An attempt to remove a cloud from title
presupposes that the plaintiff has some title to
defend.Weathers v. Salman. 86 N.M. 203, 521 P.2d

1152.
Members of the public as such do not have a
"title" in public roads. To hold otherwise would
signify some degree of ownership as an easement. It
is apparent that a member of the public cannot assert
such an ownership in a public road. Plaintiffs"l61
argue also that the general provisions for highways,
N.M.S.A. s 55-1-1 Et seq. (1953 Comp.), confer on
the public a real property interest in public roads.
Plaintiffs misconstrue the statute because it does no
more than define public highways, determine
maintenance responsibility, and provide an
administrative process for abandoning public roads.
Indeed, section 55-1-5 provides that rights of way
vest in the State of New Mexico after a state highway
has been open to the public for one year.
Thus the "interest" plaintiffs seek to assert as part of
the public is not of such a nature to enable them to
bring a suit to quiet title.
Plaintiffs also claim an interest by virtue of an
implied easement of necessity, as successor in
interest to a grantee of the United States by patent in
1936. Easements are real property interests subject to
quiet title actions. The legislative history of 28
U.S.C. s 2409a indicates that Congress intended

An easement of necessity for some purposes
could possibly have arisen when the United States
granted the patent to plaintiffs' predecessor in
interest. The complaint so asserts. 'while nothing
ordinarily passes by implication in a patent, &I&
v. United States. 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.), an implied
easement may arise within the scope of the
patent.Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 34
(9th.In Superior Oil, which involved an alleged
implied right of access over a road on Hopi land to
the plaintiff's leasehold, the court stated: "The scope
and extent of the right of access depends . . . upon
what must, under the circumstances, be attributed to
the grantor either by implication of intent or by
operation of law founded in a public policy favoring
laud utilization," (citing 2 Thompson, Real Property,
s 3621.353 F.2d at 36. In United States v. DUM. 478
F.2d 443 (9th Cir.), the court held that defendants
were entitled to a hearing to determine whether their
patent included an implied easement to construct an
access road across federal land.

f
6
JWith the dismissal on motion the issues as to the
existence of an implied easement of necessity, its
extent, or whether this road is such an easement, were
not considered. These are each mixed issues of fact
and law. The allegations in the complaint adequately
raised the claim of easement of necessity in the lands
of the United States, and an easement of such nature
is an interest which can be properly raised in a quiet
title action under 28 U.S.C. s 2409a. The facts thus
must be developed. We, of course, express no
opinion as to whether such an easement here exists,
nor its extent.

121 Similarly, the limitation issue is a mixed question
of fact and law as to whether the patentee or a
successor in interest knew or should have known of
the Govenunent's claim of no easement or of a
limited easement. Again we express no opinion as to
such limitation period, and the facts pertinent to the
commencement of the limitation period must be
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developed.
Thus by reason of the factual issues raised, but not
before the trial court, as to the easement and the
period of limitation, the case must be remanded.
We fmd no error as to the dismissal of the several
defendants nor in the way it was done. The plaintiffs
had adequate opportunity at the hearing to set aside
the orders to present their position.
The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.

END OF DOCUMENT
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of Land Management may regulate federal public
lands so as to prevent impairment of wilderness
characteristics, hut such authority is subject to uses
which were existing on October 21, 1976, the date
Federal Land Policy Management Act was enacted,
and (2) lessee's right to gain access was not an
existing use on the date of enactment of the Federal
Land Policy Management Act and, therefore, the
lessee's activity could he regulated so as to prevent
wilderness impairment, but such regulation could not
be so restrictive as to constitute a taking.
Orders in accordance with opinion
West Headnotes

W. Public Lands 317 -42
3 17 Public Lands
-

317Ir Survey and

Disposal of Lands of United

States
Donations and Bounty Lands

317k42 k. Grants by Congress in General.
Most Cited Cases
Public Lands 317 -51

Oct. 1, 1979
United States filed suit seeking a temporary
restraining order to prevent lessee of state school
trust lands, encircled by federa! land, from engaging
in any construction, road building, leveling land, or
destroying
primitive, scenic and
wildlife
characteristics on the federal land. State of Utah,
which intervened as a party defendant, filed an
answer and counterclaim alleging that, by denying its
lessee access to the school hunst lands, the United
States violated a compact with the state and
interfered with its right to hlly utilize the school trust
land. The District court, ~ l d o nJ. Anderson, Chief
Judge, held, inter alia, that: ( I ) Utah has the right of
access to state school trust lands, which right is
subject to federal regulation when its exercise
requires the crossing of federal property; however,
such regulation cannot prohibit access or be so
restrictive as to make economic developme~lt
competitively unprofitable; fuaehermore, the Bureau

3 17 Public Lands
-

317Ii Survey

and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II(E)School and University Lands
317W1 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
Generally, land grants by the federal government are
constmed strictly, and nothing is held to pass to the
grantee except that which is specifically delineated in
the instrument of conveyance; however, legislation
dealing with school trust land has always been
liberally construed.
J2
,J Public Lands 317 -51

3 17 Public Lands

-

31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
317n(E)School and University Lands
317k51 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
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to State in General. Most Cited Cases
One of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the
state school land grant legislation was to place the
states on an "equal footing" with the original 13
colonies and to enable the state to produce a fund,
accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands, with
which the state could support 12le common schools.

Cases
When a grantor conveys only a portion of his land,
and the land received by the grantee is surrounded by
what the grantor has retained, it is generally held that
the grantee has an easement of access, either by
implication or necessity, across the grantor's land.

pjj Public Lands 317 -51
Public Lands 317 -51
3 17 Public Lands
31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
317II(E)School and University Lands
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
Given the rule of liberal construction of legislation
dealing with school trust land and given the
congressional intent of enabling the state to use
school lands as a means of generating revenue,
Congress must have intended that the state of Utah,
or its lessees, have access to school lands encircled
by federal land. Act July 16, 1894,28 Stat. 107.

3 17 Public Lands
-

317II Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II1E)School and University Lands

3171t51 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
State of Utah and its lessee had a right to cross
federal land, encircling state school trust land, to
reach the school land.
J7J Public Lands 317 -96
3 17 Public Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States
Deeds 120 -118

317INI)Proceedings in Land Office

120 Deeds

120111 Construction and Operation
-

I20III(B)Property Conveyed

k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Under the common law, it was assumed that a grantor
intended to include in the conveyance whatever was
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land.
J5
.J Easements 141 -16

141 Easements
-

1411Creation, Existence, and Termination
-

141k15Implication

k. Severance of Ownership of
Dominant and Servient Tenements. Most Cited Cases

317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Only by looking at the overall use of the public lands
can one accurately assess whether or not the Bureau
of Land Management is carrying out the broad
purposes of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act; if one's view is expanded to the
complex entirety of land management decisions, then
the statute is not necessarily internally inconsistent.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, $'
102(a)(X, l2), 43 U.S.C.A. 5 1701(a)f8, 12).
181Public Lands 317 -96
3 17 Public Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

3171I(I)Proceedings in Land Office

Easements 141 -18(2)
141 Easements
1411Creation, Existence, and Termination
-

141k15Implication
141k18Ways of Necessity

141k18(2) k. Grant of Tract Partly or
Entirely Surrounded by Grantor's Land. Most Cited

317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Bureau of Land Management is not required to
immediately balance the mineral values against the
wilderness values of a particular piece of land prior to
designating the land a wilderness study area; the
BLM may, consistent with the Federal Land Policy
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and Management Act, look first at potential
wilderness characteristics and then proceed to study
the area for all its potential uses prior to formulating
its final recommendations to the executive. Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, S: 6031%
c), 43 U.S.C.A. 5 1782(a, c); Wilderness Act, S: 2 et
seq., 16U.S.C.A. 6 1131 etseq.

p
J Statutes 361 @=;5219(1)
361 Statutes
-

Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
Extrinsic Aids to Construction
Executive Construction
361k219(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Generallv, interpretation of a statute by those charged
with its execution is entitled to great deference

JpJEnvironmental Law 149E -44
Environmental Law
149EIILand Use and Conservation
149Ek44 k. Forest and Wilderness
Management. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 199k25.5(9) Health and Environment)
Public Lands 317 -96
3 17 Public Lands
--

317II Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II(I)Proceedings in Land Office
k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Under the terms of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, the Bureau of Land Management
has authority to manage public lands so as to prevent
impairment of wilderness characteristics, unless those
lands are subject to an existing use; in the latter case,
BLM may regulate so as to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation of the environment. Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 603(c), 43
U.S.C.A. 6 1782(c).
J
Public
J
Lands
l
J
317 -96

3 17 Public Lands
317II Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II(I)Proceedings in Land Office

317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Under provision of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act requiring the Bureau of Land
Management, during the period of wilderness review,
to manage the public land "in a manner so as not to
impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness * * *," the mandate that existing uses
continue in the "same manner and degree" as being
conducted on October 21, 1976, the date of the Act's
enactment, refers to activity that was actually taking
place on that date; when the statute refers to existing
uses being carried out in the same manner and
degree, it is referring to actual uses, not merely a
statutory right to use. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, S: 603(c), 43 U.S.C.A. 6
1782(c).
Mines and Minerals 260 -92.5(1)
260 Mines and Minerals
-

Cases
-

Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
2601II(A) Statutory and Official Regulations
260k92.5 Federal Law and Regulations
260k92.5(11 k. In General. Most Cited

(Formerly 260k92.5)
Provision of the Federal Land Policv and
Management Act does amend the Mining Law of
1872 and subjects rights thereunder to the Bureau of
Land Management's authority to regulate so as to
prevent wilderness impairment. Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, $9 302(b), 603, 43
U.S.C.A. 66 1732(b), 1282;30 U.S.C.A. 6 22.

J
l
3
J Public Lands 317 -96
317 Public Lands
-

a Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II(I)Proceedings in Land Office

317k96 k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Provision of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act does not mandate that the Bureau
of Land Management allow all potential uses to take
place on a particular portion of land regardless of
wilderness characteristics. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 9 201, 43 U.S.C.A. 5
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3171I(I)Proceedings in Land Office
J
4
lJPublic Lands 317 -96

3 17 Public Lands
-

-

31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
317II(I)Proceedings in Land Office
k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Bureau of Land Management's authority is limited to
preventing permanent impairment of potential
wilderness values; although it is not explicitly
provided for in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, it is consistent with Congress'
attempt to balance competing interests and with the
Wilderness Act which provides the legislative
backdrop for the relevant section of FLPMA to find
that if a given activity will have only a temporary
effect on wilderness characteristics and will not
foreclose potential wilderness designation, then that
activity should be allowed to proceed. Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 5 603, Q
U.S.C.A. 6 1782; Wilderness Act, 5 2 et seq., 16
U.S.C.A. 5 1131 et seq.

k Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Bureau of Land Management is authorized under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act to manage
public lands "by regulation or otherwise"; thus, the
agency's authority is not dependent on the issuance of
formal regulations. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, $5 302(b), 603(c), Q
U.S.C.A. 66 1732(b), 17X2(c).

1111

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

-229

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

Judicial Remedies Prior to or Pending
Administrative Proceedings
I5Ak229 k. Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies. Most Cited Cases
There is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion
when it appears that efforts to find relief within the
agency would be futile.

1181Public Lands 317 -55
317 Public Lands

Environmental Law 149E -44
149E Environmental Law
-

M

I Land Use and Conservation

149Ek44 k. Forest and Wilderness
Management. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 199k25.5(4) Health and Environment)
Definition of wilderness provided for in the
Wilderness Act and incorporated by reference into
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
contemplates that some human activity can take place
in wilderness areas as long as the area generally
appears to have been affected primarily by the forces
of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, $ 603(a), 43 U.S.C.A. $
Wilderness Act, $ 2(c), 16 U.S.C.A. 8

m.

-

31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
School and University Lands
k. Leases by State. Most Cited
Lessee of state school trust lands, against whom the
United States filed suit seeking a temporary
restraining order to prevent the lessee from engaging
in any road building or destroying wildlife
characteristics on federal land encircling the school
land, would not be required, before seeking relief
from the court to first "exhaust its administrative
remedies" by applying for a right-of-way, having
such right-of-way denied, and appealing to the
Interior Department's system of land board review,
since there was little chance that the agency would do
anything but deny the lessee's application, and the
court would not require the lessee to engage in a
useless exercise.

J
6
lJPublic Lands 317 -96

Public Lands 317 b 5 5

21C! Public Lands

-

31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States

317 Public Lands
-

=I

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
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States

-

Control. Most Cited Cases

School and University Lands
k. Leases by State. Most Cited

Cases

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction was inapplicable to
suit brought by the United States against lessee of
state school trust lands, seeking a temporary
restraining order to prevent the lessee from engaging
in "any construction, road building, leveling land, or
destroying primitive, scenic
and
wildlife
characteristics" on federal land encircling the school
lands.

-

J
2
O
J Puhlic Lands 317 -51
317 Puhlic Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

School and University Lands

w k. Effect of Reservation and Grant

to State in General. Most Cited Cases
State had to be allowed access to state school trust
lands, encircled by federal lands, so that those state
lands could be developed in a manner that would
provide funds for the common schools.
JZ
Jl

Puhlic Lands 317 -51

317 Public Lands
-

3171I Survey and Disposal

Public Lands 317 -96

3 17 Public Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317n(I)Proceedings in Land Office
k. Authority and Duties of Officers
in General. Most Cited Cases
Under the Constitution, Congress has the authority
and responsibility to manage federal lands, and
through statute, Congress has delegated this authority
to agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management.
U.S.C.A.Const.art.4.63.cl.2.

p
3
J

Puhlic Lands 317 -51

3 17 Public Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States
School and University Lands
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
Nothing in the school land grant program indicates
that, when Congress developed the school land grant
scheme, it intended to abrogate its right to control
activity on federal land. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 4. 6 3. cl.
2.
-

of Lands of United

States

317IffE)School and University Lands
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
Because it was the intent of Congress to provide
school trust lands to the state of Utah so that the state
could use them to raise revenue, the access rights of
the state to said lands, which were encircled by
federally owned land, could not be so restricted as to
destroy the economic value of the school trust lands;
that is, the state had to be allowed access which was
not so narrowly restrictive as to render the lands
incapable of their full economic development. Act
July 16, 1894,28 Stat. 107.

j
Z
4
J Puhlic Lands 317 -51
317 Public Lands
3171I Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
317IffE)School and University Lands
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
As regards state school trust land encircled by
federally owned land, it is consistent with commonlaw property principles to find that the United States,
as the holder of the servient tenement, has the right to
limit the location and use of the state's easement of
access to that which is necessary for the state's
reasonable enjoyment of its right.

J
2
2
J Public Lands 317 -7

@Public
3 17 Public Lands
3 171 Government Ownership
-

k. Governmental Authority and

Lands 317 -51

317 Public Lands
-

31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
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317n Survey and

States
?I7II(E) School and University Lands
k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
to State in General. Most Cited Cases

Public Lands 317 -55
317 Public Lands
-

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II1E)School and University Lands
k. Leases by State. Most Cited

Cases

-

Although the state of Utah or its lessee must be
allowed access to state school trust lands encircled by
federal land, the United States may regulate the
manner of access under statutes such as the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act. Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 102 et seq.,
43 U.S.C.A. 6 1701 et seq.

p
6
J Statutes 361 -223.4
361 Statutes
-

aConstruction and Operation

Disposal of Lands of United

States

317II(E)School and University Lands

cases

k. Leases by State. Most Cited

Bureau of Land Management can regulate the method
and route of access to state school trust lands
encircled by federal land, and this regulation may be
done with a view toward preventing impairment of
wilder~lesscharacteristics, assuming no existing use;
however, the regulation may not prevent the state or
its lessee from gaining access to its land, nor may it
be so prohibitively restrictive as to render the land
incapable of full economic development.

1281Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
1481Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148kZ(1))
While a government can regulate without engaging in
a taking, regulation that reaches the point of seriously
impinging on "investmeut-backed expectations" can
constitute a taking.

361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
361k223.4 k. General and Special J ) ! 2J Public Lands 317 -51
Statutes. Most Cited Cases
Under statutory rules of construction, when "special
3 17 Public Lands
acts" conflict with acts that deal with the same
31711 Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
subject matter in a more general way, the special acts
States
3School and University Lands
are to prevail, regardless of whether the special acts
were passed prior to or after the general act; but this
317k51 k. Effect of Reservation and Grant
rule does not apply if there is some indication that
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
Congress intended to modify the special act.
Public Lands 317 -96
1211Public Lands 317 -51
317 Public Lands
Survey and Disposal of Lauds of United
Public Lands
States
317n Survey and Disposal of Lands of United
States
317II(I)Proceedings in Land Office
k. Authority and Duties of Officers
3JI5J
School and University Lands
in General. Most Cited Cases
3171t51 k. Effect of Reservatiorz aud Grant
Utah has the right of access to state school trust
to State in General. Most Cited Cases
lands, which right is subject to federal regulation
when its exercise requires the crossing of federal
Public Lands 317 -55
property; however, such regulation cannot prohibit
access or be so restrictive as to make economic
3 17 Public Lands
-

-
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development
competitively
unprofitable;
furthermore, the Bureau of Land Management may
regulate federal public lands so as to prevent
impairment of wilderness characteristics, but such
authority is subject to uses which were existing on
October 21, 1976, the date Federal Land Policy and
Management Act was enacted. Act July 16, 1894,28
Stat. 107; Const.Utah art. 10, 66 3, 1;Federal Land
Policy and Manaeement Act of 1976, $ 603(a), 4.2
U.S.C.A. 6 17116); Wilderness Act, 6 2 et seq., l.6
U.S.C.A. 4 1131 et seq.
Public Lands 317 -55

317 Public Lands
-

INJUNCTION
(In Lieu of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, under Rule 52. F.R.C.P.)
ALDON J. ANDERSON, Chief Judge.
This is a case of first impression involving important
questions concerning the administration and use of
public lands. Plaintiff, the United States, filed suit on
May 25, 1979, seeking a temporary restraining order
to prevent Cotter Corporation (hereinafter Cotter)
from engaging in "any construction, road building,
leveling land, or destroying primitive, scenic and
wildlife characteristics" on certain federal land. The
court granted the 0 r d e r . m

Survey and Disposal of Lands of United

FN1. On June 1, 1979, Cotter filed a motion

States

317II(E1School and University Lands
k. Leases by State. Most Cited
In respect to state school trust lands encircled by
federal land, state lessee's right to gain access was not
an existing use on October 21, 1976, the date of
enactment of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act and, therefore, the lessee's activity
could be regulated so as to prevent wilderness
impairment, but such regulation could not be so
restrictive as to constihlte a taking. Acl July 16, 1894,
28 Stat. 107; ConstUtah art. 10, 68 3, 1;Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, $ 603(a),
43 U.S.C.A. 6 1711(a); Wilderness Act, $ 2 et seq.,
I6 U.S.C.A. 6 It31 et seq.
*999 Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Richard L.
Dewsnup, Dallin W. Jensen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt
Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
Ronald L. Reucher, U. S. Atty., and James R.
Holbrook, Asst. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
defendant United States of America.
Dale A. Kimball, Martineau, Rooker, Larsen &
Kimball, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Jolul D. Havens,
Lakewood, Colo., for defendant Cotter C o p .
Kea Bardeen, and James G. Watt, Denver, Colo., for
amicus curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation,
Utah Mining Association, Independent Petroleum
Association of the Mountain States, and Independent
Petroleum Association of America.
Mary Jane Due, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae
American Mining Congress.
MEMORANDUM OPINION, DECREE AND

for dissolution of the restraining order
claiming that the proposed road was
necessary to gain access to mineral leases on
a section of state school land and would not
cause permanent darnage. Argument was
heard and the motion was denied. On June 4,
1979, the court extended the temporary
restraining order until June 15 when
argument could be heard on the motion for
preliminary injunction.
The State of Utah moved to intervene as a party
defendant. It was unopposed and the motion was
granted by the court. Thereafter, Utah filed an answer
to the complaint and a counterclaim, alleging that by
denying Utah's lessee (Cotter) access to certain state
school trust land (section 36) the United States
violated a compact with the state and interfered with
its right to fully utilize the school trust land. This was
followed with a motion for summary judgment. On
June 6, 1979, the state filed a motion to consolidate
this case with Utah v. Andrus, C 79-0037, (D.Utah,
filed January 16, 1979). On finding that consolidation
would serve the interests of judicial economy and
would not prejudice the parties, the motion was
granted.m

FN2. On June 15 oral argument was heard
on all motions. At that time the parties
agreed that if the court would hear
arguments on a request for permanent
injunction that neither the United States nor
Cotter would take any further action with
regard to the land in question. This included
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agreement by the United States to withhold
any decision on whether or not the area
should be designated a wilderness study
area.

by the parties.
FN5.Utah Const.. Art. X, ss 3,Z.

FN6. For
On July 12, 1979, argument was heard on the request
for permanent injunction and the matter was fully
submitted, with final briefs filed t h e r e a f t e r . m T h e
court has carefully considered the matters presented
and is ready to rule.
FN3. Amicus Curiae briefs were submitted
by the Mountain States Legal Foundation
and the American Mining Congress.

FACTS
This case involves access to mining claims located on
both federal and state 1 a n d . W T h e state land is
surrounded by land in *I000 federal ownership and
land access to section 36 is possible only by crossing
federal property. The state land was granted to Utah
by the United States under the Utah Enabling Act
(Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107). The major
portion of the land in territorial Utah, at the time of
statehood, was in federal ownership. In order to
provide a tax base for the new state, the federal
government granted to Utah certain sectio~lsof land
In each township specifically, sections 2, 16, 32 and
36. But this grant was not unconditional nor was it a
unilateral gift. In order to receive the grant, Utah, like
other states, was required to use the proceeds of the
granted lands for a permanent state school trust fund.
Utah met all the conditions of the federal grant
and, upon statehood, received the sections of
1and.m

FN4. In Cotter's initial letter to the Bureau
of Land Management informing the agency
of its intent to commence road building,
Cotter indicated that the purpose of the road
was to gain access to the state school
section. (Complaint, Exhibit A,) Cotter
continued to assert this puvose in its motion
to dissolve the temporary restraining order.
Later in the proceedings, however, Cotter
argued not only for its right of access to
state school lands, but also to its federal
mining claims. Therefore, the court has
treated the case as if it involved both issues
since both issues were subsequently argued

a more detailed history of the
school land grant as it applied to Utah, see
Utah v. Kleuue, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir.
1978),cert. granted, 442 U.S. 928. 99 S.Ct.
2857.61 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979).

As a result of the state school land grants, the pattern
of property ownership in much of Utah represents a
checkerboard, with sections of school trust laud
interspersed within federal land. Since nearly twothirds of Utah's land is in federal o w n e r s h i p , m
and since this land frequently surrounds state school
sections, the question of access rights and activity on
state school and federal land is of utmost importance
to both Utah and the United States. In most
situations, neither sovereign can take any action with
regard to its land holding without impacting the
other's land.

FN7. See One Third of the Nation's Land
(Public Land Law Review Commission) at
23 (1970).
On October 21, 1976, the United States Congress
passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) intended to provide, in part, a new
statutory base for the Bureau of Land Management's
(BLM) administration of the lands within its
jurisdiction. Only a few are pertinent here. Under
section 201(a) (43 U.S.C. s 1711(a) (Suuu.197911, the
ELM
is directed to conduct an inventory of all
BLM managed lands and their resource and other
values. LJnGer s 603(a) (43 U.S.C. s 1782(a>
fSuup.I979Q, BLM is directed to examine all
roadless areas of 5000 acres or more which have been
identified during the inventory process as having
wilderness characteristics. Based on this review BLM
is to recommend to the President whether or not each
such area should be preserved as wilderness
according to the provisions of the Wilderness Act
U.S.C. s 1131 et sea. (1974D. During this period of
review BLM is to manage the lands so as to prevent
impairment of wilderness characteristics and
umecessary and undue degradation of the
e~lvironment.(Section 603(c), 43 U.S.C. s 1782(cl
fSuuu.1979~. It was against this historical and
statutory backdrop that Cotter located its mining
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claims and began building a road to gain access to
those claims.

FNs. The Act gives the Secretary of the
Department of Interior authority to c m y out
its provisions. In fact this authority has been
delegated to the Bureau of Land
Management. For the sake of simplicity, the
terms "Secretary" and "Bureau of Land
Management" are used interchangmbly.
Cotter Corporation is a uranium mining and
exploration
company
wholly
owed
by
Commonwealth Edison, a public utility serving
Northern Illinois. (Affidavit of Erik B m e r , filed
June 11, 1979.) Between January and Jme, 1976,
Cotter acquired additional federal claims and the state
mineral lease on section 36.(Id. ) The federal claims
were located pursuant to the Mining. Law of 1872 &Q
U.S.C. s 22 et seq. ).
During that last six months of 1977, Cotter conducted
drilling operations on federal land to the nonth and to
the south of the lands at issue here. These operations
indicated a "trend" of uranium ore b e t w m the two
drilling points. Subsequent drilling operations
confirmed the trend. In order to conduct these
operations, Cotter constructed access r o d s (Bruner
affidavit), but did not notify BLM of the wans%uctiou
activity. In June, 1978, Cotter began to m s m c t a
road across the lands in question here inn order to
hrther its exploratory drilling.
"1001 In the meantime, BLM proceeded with the
inventory and wilderness area examination required
by FLPMA. During the review, ELM identified a
portion of roadless unit UT-05-236 as being
appropriate for designation as a Wilderness Study
Area ( W S A 1 . m The proposed sudy unut includes
the lands in question here. In April, 1979, BLM
published the proposed area in the Federd Register
and has received public comment on the proposal
(Affidavit of Donald C. Pendleton, filed May 25,
1979). As yet BLM has not finally decided to
designate the area a formal WSA. The court IS
informed that in all likelil~oodlhe mea will be so
designated.-

FN9. The BLM procedue for cana~ringout
the wilderness review poeions of FLPMA is
as follows: First, the agency idmtifies

roadless areas of 5000 acres or more which
have wilderness characteristics. These areas
are then designated Wilderness Study Areas
(WSAs), and BLM studies each area to
determine the suitability of the area for
inclusion in the Wilderness System. At this
point in its planning, BLM looks at all the
potential uses of an area, including the
potential for mineral development. After
completion of this phase BLM reports to the
President its recommendation as to each
area's suitability (or lack thereof) for
inclusion in the Wilderness System. The
President then makes his recommendations
to Congress, which makes the final
determination.

FN10. Memorandum

Supplementing the
Initial Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Opposing Utah's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed June 8, 1979, at 3.

When BLM became aware of Cotter's road building
activity in June, 1978, it contacted Cotter personnel
and advised them of BLM's interest in the area and
requested that the road building activity be brought to
a halt. Cotter agreed to this request and ceased all
construction activity for approximately one year.
(Bruner affidavit.) On May 24, 1979, Cotter notified
BLM of its intention to begin construction of a road
to gain access to section 36 (Complaint, Exhibit A).
BLM then instituted this proceeding.
OPINION
At stake here are three very important and conflicting
interests. The state of Utah has a clear interest in
protecting its rights under the grant of school trust
lands and in being able to use those lands so as to
maximize the funds available for the public schools.
Cotter, of course, has an interest in developing its
claims in the most economical way possible. Finally,
the United States bas an interest in preserving for
hture generations the oppomtnity to experience the
solitude and peace that only an undisturbed natural
setting can provide. As noted herein, these public
interests conflict. This is reflected in the more narrow
questions
of
statutory
interpretation
and
reconciliation posed for decision. In order to resolve
the issues and effect a balance of interests, it is
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important to examine each interest and its statutory
base.
I. State School Trust Land
As previously explained, the state school land grants
were not unilateral gifts made by the United States
Congress. Rather, they were in the nature of a
bilateral compact entered into between two
sovereigns. In return for receiving the federal lands
Utah disclaimed all interest in the remainder of the
public domain, agreed to forever hold federal lands
immune from taxation, and agreed to hold the granted
lands, or the proceeds therefrom, in trust as a
common school fund. Thus, the land grants involved
here were in the nature of a contract, with a
bargained-for consideration exchanged between the
two governments. See Utah v. K l e ~ ~586
e , F.2d 756,
758 (10th Cir.
cert. granted442 U.S. 928, 99
S.Ct. 2857.61 L.Ed2d296 (19791.

m,

W Recognition of the special nature of the school
land grants is important both in determining the
Congressional intent behind the grant and in
understanding judicial treatment of similar grants.
Generally, land grants by the federal government are
construed strictly, and nothing is held to pass to the
grantee except that which is specifically delineated in
the instrument of conveyance. E. g., United States v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 353 U.S. 112. 116. 77
S.Ct. 685, 687, 1 L.Ed.2d 693 (1957). But the
legislation dealing with school trust "1002 land has
always been liberally construed. Wvomin~v. United
States. 255 U.S. 489, 508. 41 S.Ct. 393, 399, 65
L.Ed. 742 (19211; Utah v. Kleppe, supra at
761.Furthe1, it is clear that one of Congress' primary
purposes in enacting the legislation was to place the
new states on an "equal footing" wit11 the original
thirteen colonies and to enable the state to "produce a
fund, accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands,
with which the State could support the (common
schools)".Lassen v. Arizona ~ i e h w a v~ d p t . ,385
U.S. 458. 463. 87 S.Ct. 584. 587, 17 L.Ed.2d 515

m.

Given the rule of liberal const~uctionand the
Congressional intent of enabling the state to use the
school lands as a means of generating revenue, the
court must conclude that Congress intended that Utah
(or its lessees) have access to the school lands.
Unless a right of access is inferred, the very purpose

of the school trust lands would fail. Without access
the state could not develop the trust lands in any
fashion and they would become economically
worthless. This Congress did not intend.
Further, traditional property law concepts
support Utah's claimed right of access. Under the
common law it was assumed that a grantor intended
to include in the conveyance whatever was necessary
for the use and enjoyment of the land in question.
Mackie v. United States. 194 F.Supp. 306. 308
/D.Minn.l9611. When a grantor conveys only a
portion of his land, and the land received by the
grantee is surrounded by what the grantor has
retained, it is generally held that the grantee has an
easement of access, either by implication or
necessity, across the grantor's land. E. g.. United
States v. Dunn. 478 F.2d 443, 444 & n.2 (9th Cir.
Although this common law presumption might
not ordinarily apply in the context of a federal land
grant, the liberal rules of construction applied to
school trust land allow for the consideration of this
common law principle and justify its application
he1e.W

m.

FNII.The case of Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668, 99 S.Ct. 1403. 59
L.Ed.2d 677 (19791 is not apposite. In that
case the United States Supreme Court held
that the government had not reserved an
access easement in a particular land grant
because the government had the power to
condemn the land in question. The
defendants in this case have no such power.

M Therefore, the court holds that the state of Utah
and Cotter Corporation, as Utah's lessee, do have the
right to cross federal land to reach section 36, which
is a portion of the school trust lands. The extent and
nature of that right, however, remain to be
determined. In order to reach that decision the court
must examine the character and extent of BLM's
authority under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act.
11. Federal Land Policy and Management Act

121 FLPMA

represents an attempt on the part of
Congress to balance a variety of competing interests,
including those enumerated above. To some extent,
the statute appears to be internally inconsistent,
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reflecting different concerns of environmentalists,
miners, and ranchers. For example, in section 102 (Q
U.S.C. s 1701(aK8) (Suoo.19792) outlining the
Congressional declaration of policy, the statute
declares it to be the policy of the United States to
manage the public lands.
in a manner that will protect the qmiity of scientific,
scenic, historical, ecological, envirotux~ental,air and
atmospheric, water resource, md archeological
values; . . . that will provide food a d habitat for fish
and wildlife and domestic animals, and that will
provide for outdoor recreation and b m a n occupancy
and use . . .
The same section declares nation& policy to be the
management of public lands in a manner
(that) recognizes the Nation's need [or domestic
sources of kinerals, food, timber and fiber from the
public lands including implementation of (the Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970) section 21a of Title
30 as it pertains to the public lands. (Sec. (12))
*I003 On their face these two provisions appear
contradictory. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how
an agency
. . is both to encourage minim or logging and
preserve land in its natural conditiozn:~ is only when
the statute is viewed in a dynamic rather than a static
context, and is viewed as applying to all public lauds,
that the conflict can be resolved. I f & the competing
demands reflected in FLPMA were focused on one
particular piece of public laud, ia m y instances
only one set of demands could be satisfied. A parcel
of land cannot both be presewad in its natural
character and mined. Thus, it wodd be impossible
for BLM to carry out the purposes off the Act if each
particular management decision were evaluated
separately. It is only by looking at dane overall use of
the public lands that one can accurately assess
whether or not BLM is carrying out the broad
purposes of the statute. If one's view is expanded to
the complex entirety of land management decisions,
then the statute is not necffsahily internally
inconsistent. Some lands can be slreserved. while
others, more appropriately, can be &ed. BLM is not
required to fully implement section 21a of Title 30
each time it makes a decisiora wider FLPMA.
Consequently, BLM is not obliged to, and indeed
cannot, reflect all the purposes of FLPMA in each
management action.

Cotter contends that BLM must take all potential
values into account when it designates an area as a
WSA. The statute, however, envisions a dynamic
process, not a static one-time-only decision. FLPMA
is addressed in part to solving the problem of the lack
of a comprehensive plan for the use, preservation and
disposal of public lands. %Rep. No. 94-583, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 35-6 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admiu.News 1976, p. 6175. The purpose of the
inventory and the wilderness review is to enable
BLM to ascertain the character of the lands within its
jurisdiction, and the best use to which particular
portions of land can be put given such things as
wilderness characteristics, mineral values, and the
nation's needs for recreation, energy, etc. BLM is
entitled to address this oroblem one steo at a time. E.
g., Williamson v. Lee dotical CO.. 348 U.S. 483.489,
75 S.Ct. 461,465.99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).

181 BLM is not required to immediately balance

the
mineral values against the wilderness values of a
particular piece of land prior to designating the land a
WSA. BLM mav.
.. consistent with FLPMA. look first
at potential wilderness characteristics and then
proceed to study the area for all its potential uses
prior to formulating its final recommendations to the

-

executive

A. BLM's Authority Under FLPMA
Under section 603(c) (43 U.S.C. s 1782(c)
[Suoo.1979)), BLM is required, during the period of
wilderness review, to manage the pubfic land
in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such
areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, however
to the continuation of existing mining . . . uses . . . in
the manner and degree in which the same was being
conducted on October 21, 1976: Provided, That, in
managing the public lauds (BLM) shall by regulation
or otherwise take any action required to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lauds and
their resources or to afford environmental protection.
(Emphasis added in part.)
Cotter argues that this language authorizes only one
management standard: preventing undue or
unnecessary degradation of the environment. It is
Cotter's position that the use of the word
"impair""merely gives direction to the existing
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authority of (BLM) to manage with a view toward
enviromental
protection."(Supplementary
Memorandum of Defendant Cotter Corporation In
Opposition to Injunction, filed June 25, 1979, at 20.)
The United States, on the other hand, argues that
under section 603(c) there are two management
standards: one that applies to uses of the land existing
on October 21, 1976, and one that applies to uses
coming into existence after that date. Under this
interpretation, existing uses are to be regulated only
to the degree required to "1004 prevent unnecessary
and undue degradation. New uses, however, may be
(indeed, must be) regulated to the extent necessary to
prevent
impairment
of
wilderness
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ~ O b v i o u s l y ,the latter standard
is more strict.

FN12.Initially, there was some argument in
this case as to whether or not the area in
question could ever meet the definition of
wilderness under 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19741.
After the first hearings, however, that
argument was not actively pursued by either
party. Assuming that the question of the
existence of wilderness characteristics is still
at issue, the court holds that the government
has presented more than sufficient evidence
to show that the land in question meets the
criteria of 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19741. Cf.
Parker v. United States. 309 F.SUDD. 593
(D.Colo.1970), aft'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th
Cir. 19711, cert. den., sub nom.Kaibab
Industries v. Parker. 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct.
1252.31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972).
The Solicitor of the Department of Interior has
issued an opinion dated September 5, 1978,
(hereinafter referred to as "Solicitor's Opinion")
which interprets the effect of section 603(c). Under
this interpretation, section 6031~) does indeed
mandate two standards, the first of which governs
regulation of uses not in existence on October 21,
1976, and the second of which governs uses existing
on that date. (Solicitor's Opinion, pp. 11, 16.)
Generally, the interpretation of a statute by those
chareed with its execution is entitled to great
d 6 1 6 (1965); Red Lion

find no reason not to give such deference in this case.
Further, the Solicitor's interpretation fmds support in
the Act's legislative history. In the Report
No. 94-1163, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 17 (19761,
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 6175)
accompanying the House version of what was to
become FLPMA, the language of section 603(c) was
described as follows:
While tracts are under review, they are to be
managed in a manner to preserve their wilderness
character, subject to continuation of existing grazing
and mineral uses and appropriation under the mining
laws. The Secretary will continue to have authority to
prevent unnecessary and undue degradation of the
lands, including
installation of minimum
improvements, such as wildlife habitat and livestock
control improvements, where needed for the
protection or maintenance of the lands and their
resources . . . (Emphasis added.)
1t appears to the court that the above passage
indicates that the authority to manage lands so as to
prevent impairment of wilderness characteristics was
meant to he a new addition to the Secretary's
continuing authority to regulate all uses so as to
prevent undue degradation. Other parts of the
legislative history confirm this view.
The Senate version of FLPMA contained no specific
wilderness review section. Rather, it included several
sections indicating that the inventory and review
process would not, in themselves, either change or
prevent change in land use management. The Senate
Report accompanying this version indicates that the
Committee drafting the bill was concerned that
existing uses not be terminated and that firture uses,
including use as wilderness, not be foreclosed by new
activity. %Rep. No. 94-583, supra at 44,U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 6175. It appears that
the Senate and the House were concerned about
devising a way to protect both existing uses and
wilderness values present on tracts not subject to
existing uses. As interpreted by the Solicitor, section
6031~)reflects that concern. The Secretary's authority
to preserve wilderness is subject to existing uses
which may not be arbitrarily terminated, nor
regulated solely with a view to preserving wilderness
characteristics. But the Secretary may continue to
regulate such uses in order to prevent unnecessary or
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undue degradation. On the other hand, activity on
lands with potential wilderness value which are not
subject to existing uses may be regulated more
stringently so as to preserve wilderness
characteristics. The Solicitor's interpretation is
consistent with the Act's legislative history and
reflects the full measure*1005 of Congressional
intent in the adoption of 603(c). Cotter's
interpretation reflects only one of Congress' concerns,
i. e., protection of existing uses.
Finally, the Solicitor's interpretation is supported by
the language and structure of the statute itself. The
word "impair" would prevent many activities that
would not be prevented by the language of
"unnecessary or undue degradation." W F o r
example, commercial timber harvesting, if conducted
care&lly, would not result in unnecessary or undue
degradation of the environment. See, One Third of
the Nation's Land (Public Land Law Review
Commission) 102 (1970). But the same activity
might well impair wilderness characteristics as those
are defined in 16 U.S.C. s 1131 (19711. Compare
Parker v. United States, 309 F.Sum. 5 9 3
{D.Colo.19701, affd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 19711,
c e ~ tden.
.
sub nom., Kaibab Industries v. Parker. 405
U.S. 989.92 S.Ct. 1252.31 L.Ed.2d455 119721, with
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butt,
541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 19761. Further, if Congress
had not intended to mandate two standards, it wonld
merely have indicated that the Secretary was to
continue to manage all lands so as to prevent
unnecessary degradation. If one takes the position
that this is what Congress intended, then the language
of impairment must be mere surplusage. Statutory
rules of construction are against such a
finding.[FNI41WiIderness Society v . Morton. 156
U.S.Aov.D.C. 121. 135. 479 F.2d 842. 856
(D.C.Cir.19731, cert. den., 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct
1550.36 L.Ed.2d 309 (19781.
FN13. As stated in the amicus brief of the
American Mining Congress:

A reasonable interpretation of the word
"unnecessary" is that which is not
necessary for mining. "Undue" is that
which is excessive, improper, imtnodetate
or unwarranted.

Brief

of Amicus American

Mining

Congress in Opposition to the United
States' Request for Permanent Injunction,
filed July 6, 1979, at 9.

FN14. There is further indication within
FLPMA itself that the Congress intended
two management standards. Section 302(b)
provides:
Except as provided in 1744, 1781(f) and
1782 (section 603) of this title and in the
last sentence of this paragraph, no
provision . . . shall in any way amend the
Mining Law of 1872 . . . .
The last sentence of 302(b) is as folfows:
In managing the public lands the
Secretary shall, by regulation or
otherwise, take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation
of the lands.
If the standard of undue degradation were
not separate and distinct from the
impairment standard contained in section
603(c), there would have been no need to
include both the last sentence and
reference to section 603(c) in section
302(b). By making distinct reference to
both standards in 302(b), Congress
indicated its intent to formulate two
different approaches to management of
the public lands.
Moreover, legislative history confirms that the
language of impairment was not surplusage. Initial
drafts of the bill in the House did not contain this
language; it was added at the suggestion of
Congressman Dellenback who stated that the purpose
of the language was to keep the Secretary from
"changing anything." Its purpose was to maintain the
existing character and use of public lands whether
that use was wilderness or developed recreation.
(Solicitor's Opinion, p. 16).
Therefore, the court holds that under the terms
of FLPMA the BLM has the authority to manage
public lands so as to prevent impairment of
wilderness characteristics, unless those lands are
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subject to an existing use. In the latter case BLM may
regulate so as to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the environment.
B. Cotter's Rights Under FLPMA
Given that there are two standards by which BLM
can manage the public lands, it remains to he
determined what standards apply to Cotter's activity.
Cotter argues that its activity falls within the existing
use provision of 603(c). The main thrust of Cotter's
argument is as follows:
1) under the Mining Law of 1872, Cotter has a right
of access to its unpatented claims;
2) Cotter, as Utah's lessee, also has a right of access
to state school land;
3) these rights, even though not exercised prior to
Octoher, 1976, constitute existing uses under
FLPMA.
1111*1006 Section 603(c) mandates that existing uses
mav continue in the "same manner and deeree" as
heihg conducted on Octoher 21, 1976. ~ n i e s sthe
statute is referring to activity that was actually taking
place on that date, there is no way to give meaningful
context to the "manner and degree" laneuaee. In
order to determine whether or not a eiven overation is
heine conducted in the same manner and degree as it
was formerly heing conducted, there must he some
former activity against which the extent of the
present operation can he measured. Presumably,
when the statute refers to existing uses heing carried
out in the same manner and degree it is referring to
actual uses, not merely a statutoryright to use.

-

-

-

- -

-

1121 Cotter

next points to section 302(h) as an
indication that its rights of access camlot he denied
under FLPMA. Cotter's emphasis in quoting 302(b)
is, however, selective. Section 302(h) provides in
pertinent part:
Except as provided in 1744, 1781(f) and 1782
(section 603) of this title and in the last sentence of
this paragraph no provision of this section or any
other section of this Act shall in any way amend the
Mining Law of 1872 or impair the righ~sof any
locators of claims under that Act, including, hut not

limited to, rights of ingress and egress. (Emphasis
added.)
Cotter enlphasizes only the latter portion of this
section and from this argues that no provision of
FLPMA can he taken to amend the Mining Law of
1872. On its face, however, this section makes clear
that section 603 does amend the Mining Law of
1872. Rights under that law, including rights of
ingress and egress, can be impaired by virtue of
section 603. Moreover, the Mining Law itself makes
clear that rights of access to mining claims are not
absolute, Such rights are subject to regulation under
30 U.S.C. s 22 (1971).
It might also he argued that section 201 (43 U.S.C. s
1711 (Supp.1979)) acts as a limitation on BLM's
right to restrict Cotter's right of access to its federal
claims. Section 201 provides in pertinent part:
The preparation and maintenance of such inventory
or the identification of such areas (of critical
ellvironmental concern) shall not, of itself, change or
prevent change of the management or use of public
lands.
The argument is that since, prior to BLM's inventory,
this land was open to all mining activity, section 201
prevents BLM from changing the use to which the
land was being put if such change is based solely on
the results of the inventory
In the Report accompanying the Senate version of
FLPMA (S.Rep. No. 94-58, supra at 44), section 201
is explained as follows:
The purpose of this statement is to insure that, under
no circumstances will the pattern of uses on the
national resource land he frozen, or will uses be
automatically terminated during the preparation of
the inventory and identification of areas possessil~g
wilderness characteristics. Equity demands that the
Secretary uot he barred from considering and
permitting new uses during the lengthy inventory and
identification processes. On the other hand, the "of
itself' language is not meant to he license to continue
to allow or disallow uses as if no inventory and
identification process were being conducted. The
Committee fully expects that the Secretary, wherever
possible, will make management decisions which will
insure that no future use or combination of uses
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which might be discovered as appropriate in the
inventory or identification process . . . will be
foreclosed by any use or combination of uses
conducted after enactment of S.507, but prior to the
completion of those processes. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the Congress
intended to
provide a balanced solution to the problem *I007 of
land management during the inventory process.
While Congress did not intend the use of public lands
to be Frozen pending the outcome of the inventory
process, neither did it want f u m e uses to be
foreclosed by the impact of present activity. Further,
the Congress recognized that it might not be possible
to both allow present uses and prevent foreclosure of
certain other future uses.

Fn15. While

the legislative history quoted
here is from the Senate Report, the IHouse
version of the hill contained no similar
language. The language was adopted in the
conference committee, but without any
further indication as to the Congressional
intent behind the language. Thus, it is
possible to assume that the Senate Report
accurately reflects the irntent of the
Congress, there being rpo contrary
indication.
This is consistent with the decision in Parker v.
United States, supra. In that case, involving the
Wilderness Act, the court held that the Department of
Agriculture could not take any act& that would
foreclose Congressional consideration of an area's
potential for wilderness d e s i g n a t i o i ~ . m I nthis
case, if BLM could not prevent activity that would
permanently impair wilderness characteristics, then
those characteristics could he destroyed before either
BLM or the Congress had the chance to evaluate an
area's potential uses. This Congress dud not intend.

E&&. Amicus American Mining Congress
has cited a portion of legislative history
indicating that Congress inswed section 201
into FLPMA with the inteat of overruling
the Parker case. See, Brief of Amicus
American Mining Congress na Opposition to
the United States' Request tor Permanent
Injunction, supra. It shodd he noted,
however, that the statement quoted hy the
amicus is from the Senate Committee Report

Page 15

on Senate Bill 424, a bill that was debated
some time p r i ~ to
r the debate and passage of
FLPMA. Perhaps more important, the final
statement of the Senate intent behind
including section 201 (or section 102 as it
was in the initial version) contains language
almost identical to that quoted by the
amicus, but does not include any reference
to the P a r k a case. The fact that this
language was omitted from subsequent
statements of legislative intent argues that
Congress, in fact, did not intend to overrule
Parker. Certainly, without a more definitive
statement, this: court will not assume that
Congress set out to undo that decision.
Therefore, the court holds that I) BLM may
regulate activity on fderal land so as to prevent
impairment of potential wilderness characteristics; 2)
the authority to so regulate is subject to uses actually
existing on October 21, 1976; 3) section 603 does
amend the Mining Law of 1872 and subjects rights
thereunder to BLM's authority to regulate so as to
prevent wilderness impairment; 4) section 201 does
not mandate that BLM allow all potential uses to take
place on a particular portion of land regardless of
wilderness characteristia.
&
BLM's
i
J
authority is, however, limited to
preventing permanemi impairment of potential
wilderness values. Mthough it is not explicitly
provided for in FLPMA, it is consistent with
Congress' attempt to M a n c e competing interests and
with the Wilderness Act which provides the
legislative backdrop for section 603
to find
that if a given activit,y will have only a temporary
effect on wilderness characteristics and will not
foreclose potential wijbdemess designation then that
activity should he allowed to proceed.

Opiniam of the Solicitor of the United
States Department of Interior, September 5,
1978, at 4.
&$j
The definition of wilderness provided for in the
Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. s 1131(cU and
incorporated by reference into FLPMA in section
603(a) contemplates ehat some human activity can
take place in wildemss areas as long as the area
"generally appears to [save been affected primarily by
the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
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substantially unnoticeable. . .

."m

Further, the draft statement of BLM's Interim
Management Policy and Guidelines for Wilderness
Study Areas (January 12, 1979, at 9) recognizes that
temporaty activities, the negative impacts of which
could he substantially reversed through appropriate
reclamation procedures, would not impair wilderness
characteristics under the terms of 603(c).
There has been a great deal of argument in this case
over whether or not the effects of Cotter's proposed
road and drilling operations can he successfully
reclaimed. Unfortunately*1008 the factual matters
inherent in such an argument have not been
sufficiently addressed. At the July 12 hearing on the
motion for permanent injunction, Cotter proffered,
for the first time, its reclamation plan. BLM has not
had the opportunity to review the plan nor to make a
comparison of the costs and feasibility of reclamation
of a land access route over the cost and effect of other
forms of access.
1161117111811191In view of the court's findings and
conclusious of law, the BLM must he given the
opportunity to review and respond to Cotter's
reclamation plan. BLM has no formal regulations for
review of proposed activity within potential WSA.
But BLM is authorized under FLPMA to manage the
public lands "by regulation or otherwise . . . ." See
sections 302(h) and 603(c). Thus, the agency's
authority is not dependent on the issuance of formal
r e g u 1 a t i o n s . w Further, in a lawsuit involving
issues of the magnitude and importance as those
involved here, it is imperative that all parties have the
opportunity to respond to critical factual issues.
Moreover, the question of the adequacy of a
reclamation plan is precisely the kind of question to
which the expertise of an administrative agency is
most relevant: Cf Izaak Walton League of - h e &
v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir.), cert. den.,
419 U.S. 1009.95 S.Ct. 329.42 L.Ed.2d 284 (19741.
The court is ill-eauioued at this stage of the litigation
to make a factual determination on the comnlex
question of the comparative "1009 costs and
feasihility of reclamation efforts over other forms of
access. Thus, the court orders that BLM must be
given the opportunity to expeditiously review Cotter's
reclamation plan with a view to determining whether

.

A.

-

-

or not the impact of the proposed road will he
temporaly or permanent and with a view toward
comparing the cost and feasihility of reclamation
with the cost and feasibility of alternative forms of
access.
BLM has argued strenuously that
Cotter should he required to "exhaust its
administrative remedies" by applying for a
right-of-way, having such right-of-way
denied, appealing through the Interior
system of land board review, and then
applying to the court for relief. BLM has
also argued that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction ought to apply and that this
court should forego action until Interior has
had the chance to formally act in the matter.
The court does not agree with either
argument.
In the first place, there is considerable
question as to whether or not a) Cotter is
required to apply for a right of way o r b )
if it is so required, that there is any
procedure by which it could have done so.
Although BLM now argues that such a
procedure exists and that knowledge of
the procedure was available to the public,
ELM employees previously told Cotter
that no such apphcation was required.
Further, BLM aud Cotter have been
negotiating this road for over a year and
Cotter was never told to complete a rightof-way application during that time. If no
procedure for exhausting administrative
remedies exists, [hen Cotter cannot be
penalized for not pursuing such remedies.
Further, there is an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion when it appears
that efforts to find relief within the agency
would he futile.Bendure v. United States,
554 F.2d 427 (Ct.Cl.1977). Given
Interior's position in this case, there is
little chance that the agency would do
anything but deny Cotter's application.
The court will not require Cotter to
engage in a useless exercise.
As to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
the court finds that it does not apply in
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this case. As defined by the U. S. Supreme
Court
"Primary jurisdiction" . . . .=Pies where a
claim is originally cogmhble in the
courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues, ~hhch,under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special co-nce
of an
administrative body; in suck a case the
judicial process is suspamdied pending
referral of such isaws to the
administrative body for its views.
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad
Co., 352 U.S. 59. 63-4. 77S.Ct. 161. 165,
1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956) (emphasis added).
In this case, there is no regdatory scheme
beyond the broad provisim of FLPMA.
Cf. Izaak Walton L e a ~ u eof America v.
St. Clair. 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
That is, BLM has no pdblushed adopted
urocedure through which tit would handle
cotter's claim. The doctrim would seem
to assume an administra@ivemechanism
through which primary jmldydliction could
be exercised. In this case t k r e is no such
mechanism. Further, in initwang this suit,
ELM did not ask that Caaaos be enjoined
pending BLM's processing of any
application that Cotter might make. It
asked the court to permanently enjoin
Cotter or to enjoin C&er pending a
Solicitor's opinion on the state school land
issue. Apparently BLM is not as
concerned about the oowt's taking
jurisdiction of this case wi&out any prior
Interior action, if the cawit rules in its
favor and permanently eqieoojoins Cotter
from any further activity. Under these
circumstances, the court Ends that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiion does not
apply in this case. The o ~ q p o m i t ygiven
BLM to review the r e c l d o n plan is
based solely on the court's p s p t i o n that
BLM should be given the .@pportunity to
respond to the fachlal issues raised by the
reclamation plan and that ik court is not
equipped to decide this issue raised by the
plan at this time. It is not b d on Cotter's

alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies nor on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
If BLM should decide that the effects of the road
will, indeed, be permanent, then the parties (and
probably this court) may be required to conhont this
and other disputed issues. In the interest, however, of
giving this judgment finality for the purposes of
appeal and for purposes of the parties' own pl'tmning,
the court chooses not to keep jurisdiction over the
lawsuit. The court is aware that should BLM delay
reviewing the reclamation plan or make a &cision
contrary to Cotter's interest, that the parties may need
to institute a new lawsuit in order to obtain, a final
resolution of their dispute. In that event, the court
will give the new lawsuit the highest priority amrd will
handle the matter as expeditiously as pwssible.
However, in light of the possibility that further
litigation will be necessary, and in light of the fact
that throughout the litigation BLM has assumed that
the effects of the road would be permanent and thus
has put the questions of regulation of access to
federal and state land at issue, the court will address
the questions remaining in the lawsu~t.
~

~

111. FLPMA and the State School Lauds

12411211The state must be allowed access to the state
school trnst lands so that those lands can be
developed in a manner that will provide funds for the
common schools. Further, because it was the intent of
Congress to provide these lands to the state so that
the state could use them to raise revenue, Lassen v.
Arizona Highway Dept., supra, the access rights of
the state cannot be so restricted as to destsoy the
lands' economic value. That is, the state must be
allowed access which is not so narrowly restrictive as
to render the lands incapable of their full economic
development.
1221123112411251 The state's right of access is not,
however, absolute. Under the Constitution Congress
has the authority and responsibility to manage federal
laud. U.S.Const. Art. IV, s 3. c1.2. Through statute
Congress has delegated this authority to agencies
such as the Bureau of Land Management. Gammon v.
United States. 252 U.S. 450. 459-60, 40 S . . a 410,
412. 64 L.Ed. 659 (1920). There is nothing in the
school land grant program that would indicate that
when Congress developed the school land grant
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scheme ia intended to abrogate its right to control
activity OD federal land. Further, it is consistent with
common h w property principles to find that the
United Stabes, as the holder of the sewient tenement,
has the right to limit the location and use of Utah's
easement of access to that which is necessary for the
state's reasonable enioyment
of its right. See, e. g.,
* .
United Sbtes v. Huehes. 278 F.Suuu. 733
(E.D.Tentm.1967). Thus, the court holds that, although
the state of Utah or its lessee must be allowed access
to sectiom 36, the United States may regulate the
manner ofiaccess under statutes such as FLPMA.
The United States has argued here that not only can
the United States regulate Utah's route across federal
land, it c m also prevent access if it finds that such
access woald impair wilderness characteristics. The
state couneers by arguing that if such access can be
preventedlunder FLPMA, then the statute violates the
Fifth Amendment by accomplishing taking of
property without just compensation.
The court has already rejected the argument
made by the government based on an analysis of the
Congressional intent behind the school land grants.
The couct further finds that the school land grants
were accomplished under what is termed "special"
legislatiout Under statutory rules of construction,
when "special acts" conflict with acts which deal
with the same subject matter in a more general way,
the special acts are to prevail, regardless of whether
the special acts were passed prior to or *I010 after
the general act. See Utah v. Kleppe, supra at 76869.0f cowse, this rule does not apply if there is some
indication) that Congress intended to modify the
special act. There is, however, no such indication in
the legisrative history of FLPMA. Indeed, the terms
of FLPMA itself would indicate that Congress did
not intend to amend rights under the school land
grant program. See section 701(g)(6) (codified at $3
U.S.C.A..s 1701 note (Supp.1979)).
Thus, the court finds that 1) ELM can regulate
the method and route of access to state school trust
lands; 2)) bhis regulation may be done with a view
toward preventing impairment of wilderness
characteristics (assuming no existing use);
3)
the regulation may not, however, prevent the state or
its lessee from gaining access to its land, nor may it
be so prohibitively restrictive as to render the land
incapable of full economic development.

FN20. The

Court had also assumed, and
now holds, that Utah's right of access to the
state school land is not, in this case, an
existing use since the right was not
exercised prior to October 21, 1976.

IV. FLPMA and Access Rights Over Federal Land

Section 701(h) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. s 1701 note
(Supp. 1979)) of FLPMA provides:
All actions by the Secretary concerned under this Act
shall be subject to valid existing rights.
The Solicitor has interpreted this section to mean that
valid existing rights cannot be taken pursuant to
section 603. (Solicitor's Opinion, p. 32)The
court agrees with this interpretation. The court has
also found, however, that Cotter's right of access to
both its federal and state claims can be regulated.
FN21. The
-

Solicitor also states that such
rights may not be condemned. Without
further explanation, the court cannot
determine why such rights could not be
condemned, assuming just compensation
was paid. Certainly, there does not seem to
be anything on the face of section 701(h)
that would prevent condemnation of and
payment for existing rights. Thus, the court
does not adopt this portion of the Solicitor's
opinion.

The parties have stipulated that "Cotter's proposed
road appears to be the only feasible and least
environmentally disruptive land access for Cotter to
its targeted drilling sites and for entry into state
section 36 . . ." (Joint Pretrial Stipulation, filed July
9, 1979; emphasis added in pan). Thus, in this case,
regulation to prevent wilderness impairment could
result in total prohibition of land access. BLM has
contended that helicopter access is available, feasible
and acceptable to the agency. Cotter contends that
such access would be prohibitively expensive and
would not result in any substantial saving of the
environment. This issue was not, however, the
subject of live testimony with full cross-examination.
The court is not, therefore, provided with sufficient
information on which to base a ruling. To further
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complicate the case, it is not clear that the entire
proposed road is necessary for Cotter to gain access
to section 3 6 . m T h i s is important because
different criteria may be applied to judge the
propriety of regulation of state, as opposed to federal,
access rights. It 111ay be that requiring helicopter
access to section 36 would be sufficiently expensive
so as to render minerals on that section incapable of
*I011 economic development. Therefore, requiring
such access and denying land access would violate
the intent of the school trust grant. It may be,
however, that requiring such access to federal claims
would not be so expensive as to constitute a taking
under 701(h). If the entire road is not necessaly to
gain access to section 36, then it a u l d be that
substantial parts of it could be prohibited, while other
parts could not. Unfortunately, on the record as it
now stands, this matter is far from clear.
FN22. Cotter has asserted h
-

i because of
the section's terrain it cannot cut across the
section. Rather, it must elnber from two
points: one on the north, the other on the
south. See Affidavit of Erik Bruner, filed
June 11, 1979. This is, however, a mere
conclusory allegation. Wuthout further
information it is impossible to h o w whether
it would be more expensive to cut through
section 36 from north to south, prohibitively
expensive, or physically impossible to do so.
Even if it would be physically impossible,
there still remains the queslion of whether
access to one portion of the section is
sufficient to prevent an abrogation of Utah's
access rights.

It is also true that the p&es stipulated
that the proposed road was the only
feasible route to the f e d a d claims and
section 36. It is not c t w from this
stipulation, however, that the United
States agreed that the emtire road was
necessary to gain access ao section 36
alone. Further, the g o v e m e n t now
vigorously contends that it was unaware
of the extensions to section 36 until this
lawsuit began.
Finally, the record contains very linle factual
information relevant to the taking issue. The court
recognizes that a government can regulate without

engaging in a taking. The court also recognizes,
however, that when regulation reaches the point of
seriously impinging
on
"investment-hacked
expectations," it can constitute a taking. Pennwlvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 43 S.Ct. 158, 67
L.Ed. 322 (1922); Goldblatt v. Hempstead. 364 U.S.
590, 82 S.Ct. 987. 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). Given its
current information, the court feels that there is a
substantial question of a taking in this case if access
to federal claims are indefinitely prohibited or if
alternative access is unreasonably expensive. The
facts in this case are not, however, sufficientty clear
at this time for the formulation of a ruling on this
matter.
In sum, the court holds that Utah does have
a right of access to state school trust lands. That right
is subject to federal regulation when its exercise
requires the crossing of federal property. Such
regulation cannot, however, prohibit access or be so
restrictive as to make economic development
competitively unprofitable. Further, the court holds
that BLM may regulate federal public land so as to
prevent inrpaiment of wilderness characteristics.
Such authority is, however, subject to uses which
were existing on October 21, 1976. These uses must
have been actually existing on that date. Cotter's right
to gain access was not an existing use on October 21,
1976. Therefore, Cotter's activity may be regulated so
as to prevent wilderness impairment. But such
regulation cannot be so restrictive as to constitute a
taking. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
DECREED AND DECLARED that the State of
Utah, and Cotter Corporation as its lessee, have a
right of access to state school section 36, which
section is more precisely described in Exhibit A of
the complaint filed herein. That right is subject to
reasonable regulation by the United States
Department of the Interior to prevent impairment of
wilderness characteristics, but without damaging the
competitive economic development of it. The United
States may not, in carrying out such regulation,
prohibit access. But the United States may, within the
limits of the state school land grants and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, review and
regulate the proposed nature and location of access
roads.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,
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DECREED AND DECLARED that Cotter
Corporation, as the owner of certain unpatented
mining claims on federal land, more precisely
described in the complaint filed herein, has a right of
access to its mining claims. That right is subject to
regulation by the United States Department of the
Interior to prevent impairment of wilderness
characteristics. In canying out such regulation the
United States may not permanently deprive Cotter
Corporation of access to its claims. But the United
Stales may, within the limits of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, prescribe the mode
of access and the location of access roads, if any.
IT IS FURTHER ORDEmD, ADJUDGED,
DECREED AND DECLARED that the United States
Department of the Interior must he given the
opportunity to review Cotter Corporation's proposed
reclamation plan and the necessity of constructing the
entire proposed road to gain access to section 36.
Therefore, Cotter Corporation is hereby enjoined
from engaging in any coi~struction, road building,
leveling land or destroying primitive, scenic and
wildlife characteristics on certain federal land as
described in the complaint filed *I012 herein until
such time as the Department of the Interior has
reviewed the reclamation plan and the proposed
extensions of the road into section 36 and rendered a
decision thereon. At such time as the Department's
decision is rendered, the parties may pursue such
firther remedies before this court as they deem
necessary.
D.C.Utah, 1979.
State of Utah v. Andrus
486 F.Supp. 995, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,570
END OF DOCUMENT
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EXHIBIT A
Map Identifving Roads Used To Access
The Backman Properq
[See, Attached.]

EXHIBIT A - Page 1
Map Identifying Roads Used To Access The Backman Property
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Turtle Rock Road /SyrinpCceek Road

EXHIBIT B
Chain Of Title To The Backman Property
ie., S 112 of the NW 114 and the

S 112 of the NW ?4 of the NW 114 of
Section 8, Township 57 North, Range 2 West,
Boise Meridian
[The defined termslreferences used in this Exhibit A have the
same meanings as assigned to them in Appellants' Brief.]
Humbird owned the Backman Property until 1945, when it conveyed the property to
Wert.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit4.

In 1952, Wert conveyed the Backman Property to Brown.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. In 1969, Brown conveyed the Backman Property to Long Lake Lumber
Company ("Long Lake"). Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6-7. In 1980, Pack River Company, a subsidiary
of Long Lake, conveyed the Backman Property to Pack River Management Company.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8.

In 1984, Pack River Management Company conveyed the Backman

Property to Shamrock Investment Company ("Shamrock").

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9. Shamrock

conveyed the Backman Property to itself in 1990 to reflect a conversion in the company from a
limited to a general partnership. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10.
Powers purchased the Backman Property in 1994.

R. Vol. 11, p. 261; Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 11. Powers conveyed the Backman Property to his mother, McGhee, a few weeks later.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12. McGhee conveyed the Backman Property back to Powers in May 1995.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. Powers sold the Schrader Property to Schrader's predecessor-in-interest
in 1995. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-62. Powers conveyed the Backman Property to Backmans in 2005.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15.

EXHIBIT B - Page 1
Chain Of Title To The Backman Property
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